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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Food aid cannot properly meet the needs which it is 
intended to satisfy unless it arrives at its destination on the 
right date and in the stipulated quantity and unless the 
nature, characteristics and packaging of the products are 
satisfactory and comply with the conditions laid down in 
the supply agreement and the applicable regulations. 
Legislation cannot, however, provide for all possible cases 
and will never serve as a substitute for common sense and 
obvious facts. 
1.2. The operations leading up to the distribution of food 
aid are numerous, complex and politically sensitive: 
(a) they include the processing, packing, handling, 
storage, transport and analysis of products; 
(b) the Council and the Commission plus a whole host of 
economic operators, acting both within and outside 
the Community, make up the links in a long chain of 
responsibility; 
(c) the inter-institutional balance within the Community 
and the latter's relations with the Member States are 
to be understood in the light of the overall 
development-aid policy and the common agricultural 
policy. 
1.3. In a previous special report, adopted on 30 October 
1980, the Court of Auditors presented a general survey of 
the system for managing food aid. This report takes that 
analysis a stage further by examining whether or not the 
products delivered comply with the standards required by 
law and common sense. The Court has compiled a list of 
all the unsatisfactory cases — about 90, some relating to 
one single consignment and others to a series of 
consignments — which it found during audit visits 
performed between 1981 and 1985 in over 20 countries 
and as a result of an enquiry into the cases handled by the 
food-aid disputes department at the Commission's 
Directorate-General for Development. These cases are 
classified and described in Annex 1. 
.1.4. The number of lots (*) of food aid delivered during 
the period in question (1976—1985) is large and may be 
estimated at about 8 000. As for the 90 cases of faulty 
deliveries described in Annex 1, they represent a number of 
lots to which it is difficult to put a figure, but which must 
be in the region of between 200 and 400. In any case, the 
problem is not so much one of assessing how representative 
these few hundred lots are in relation to the 8 000, as of 
(') The footnotes are set out together at the end of the report. 
using this sample to analyse the reasons for the 
shortcomings and to suggest remedies. The shortcomings 
and contradictions in the present system, which are to 
blame for these failings, have been detected with regard 
to: 
(a) the applicable rules; 
(b) the checks made; 
(c) and the guarantees implemented. 
The report concludes with recommendations for reforming 
the system. 
1.5. This report was sent for the first time by the Court of 
Auditors to the Commission on 16 January 1987 in order 
to allow the latter to draw up its replies. A few days 
beforehand the basic regulation on food-aid policy and 
food-aid management (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3972/86, published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities of 30 December 1986) had entered into 
force. Obviously, all the observations in the report concern 
operations which took place before the entry into force of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3972/86, on 2 January 1987. 
However, the Court has noted that the reforms introduced 
by this new regulation, which should soon be 
supplemented by the reform and standardization of 
mobilization procedures relating to these products, (the 
draft regulation of the Commission having already been 
made), agree with its own recommendations on several 
important points. 
2. THE APPLICABLE RULES 
2.1. The basis for any supply of food aid is a supply 
agreement. The Community undertakes to deliver a certain 
tonnage of a particular product. The recipient undertakes 
to abide by certain terms regarding the taking-over and use 
of the product and to account for the way it has been used. 
The supply agreement, which is drawn up and negotiated 
by the Directorate-General for Development (DG VIII), 
lays down the recipient's rights and duties. 
2.2. Food aid is governed by a number of regulations: 
(a) the only text that is entirely general in scope is Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3331/82 of 3 December 
1982 (
2) on food-aid policy and food-aid 
management, which remained in force until 1 January 
1987; 
(b) two regulations lay down implementing provisions for 
the mobilization of products: 
(i) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80 of 
22 July 1980 (cereals and rice) (
3) (
4); 
(ii) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 of 
17 May 1983 (skimmed-milk powder, butter and 
butteroil) (
3) (
J); 17. 8. 87  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 219/5 
(c) furthermore, food aid is governed by various 
agricultural policy regulations, not only when aid is 
drawn from intervention stocks but also when it has 
to be mobilized on the European market; 
(d) the aid must also comply with the law in the Member 
States, for example, certain health standards; 
(e) each aid operation must be carried out in accordance 
with a specific mobilization regulation and a suitable 
notice of invitation to tender, drawn up by the 
Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG VI) and 
adopted by the Commission after it has obtained on 
opinion from a management committee. 
2.3. The annual programme is defined by: 
(a) the budget, which lays down the appropriations per 
category of product; 
(b) the Council Regulation laying down the implementing 
rules for the year in question (total quantities to be 
delivered of each category of product, detailed list of 
products likely to be used as food aid, list of countries 
and organisations likely to receive aid) (these rules 
were in force until the end of 1986); 
(c) the special aid allocations, decided on a case-by-case 
basis by the Commission. 
The supply agreements 
The comprehensiveness of the agreements 
2.4. The supply agreements («) specify the nature of the 
product, the quantity, the packaging and, sometimes, what 
is to be marked on the packages. However: 
(a) they fail to mention the delivery period, which is 
arranged informally between the Commission and the 
recipient. Other donors are not reluctant to commit 
themselves to a delivery time in their own agreements. 
This failure to specify the delivery period leaves the 
door wide open to delays in the mobilization of aid; 
(b) similarly, the port of shipment for an FOB (
7) delivery 
is never specified in the agreements. The tenderers 
select the port of shipment unilaterally. This practice 
is such as to increase the sea transport costs for the 
recipient. In many cases of CIF (
8) deliveries, the port 
of unloading is also not mentioned in the agreement; 
(c) lastly, the agreements generally confine themselves to 
indicating the nature of the product without specifying 
further details. This may result in a product being 
supplied which does not meet the precise local 
requirements. The case of 240 t of butteroil supplied 
in 1983 to the Word Food Programme (WFP) for 
Morocco is interesting in this respect: the percentage 
of aerobic germs was higher than the maximum 
authorized under Moroccan rules. The only way of 
making national regulations such as these binding 
would be to include them in the agreement and the 
mobilization regulation, because, as things are, the 
intervention agencies and the successful tenderers are 
riot bound by the recipient country's regulations. 
Applicability of the agreements 
2.5. In the broad sense, the supply agreement is the 
official letter signed by the two parties, preceded and 
followed by less formal correspondence, which lays down 
certain details of the aid (e. g. the delivery period). DG VIII 
defines the operations and concludes the supply agreements 
and then sends a 'mobilization request' (
6) to DG VI, which 
mobilizes the aid, or arranges for the intervention agencies 
to do so, by drawing up the mobilization regulation {«) and 
the notice of invitation to tender («). 
2.6. Often the date planned for the delivery and notified 
by DG VIII to DG VI is not kept to because of the 
sluggishness of the mobilization process. Above all, the 
process is slow because some of the specifications in the 
agreements have to be transcribed by DG VIII in the 
mobilization request in order to be sent to DG VI and 
included in the mobilization regulation. Experience has 
shown that these three documents sometimes contradict 
each other: 
(a) for 15 000 t of maize granted to Mozambique, the 
agreement laid down that the grain would be taken 
over at the port of unloading, whereas the 
mobilization regulation specified the port of shipment, 
in accordance with the mobilization request; 
(b) for a delivery to Lebanon in 1983 of 2501 of soya oil 
via the UNRWA('), under the 1982 programme, 
there was a contradiction in the official letter which 
made it unclear as to the point where the costs were 
divided, especially with regard to unloading costs and 
the transfer of total liability for the goods from the 
successful tenderer to the recipient. According to one 
interpretation, the transfer took place at the port of 
shipment and according to the other, at the port of 
. unloading. The notice of invitation to tender, by 
defining the delivery stage as CIF, without further 
details, stated, by implication, that the goods were to 
be taken over at the port of shipment, in accordance 
with the recognized acceptation in commercial 
practice of the term 'CIF; No C 219/6 Official Journal of the European Communities 17. 8. 87 
(c) in respect of 500 t of skimmed-milk powder granted 
to Mauritius and delivered in 1982 without any added 
vitamins, the agreement laid down that the product 
should be vitaminized. The mobilization request failed 
to repeat this stipulation; 
(d) in the case of a delivery to India in 1982 of 5 000 t of 
skimmed-milk powder that was too old, the 
agreement specified powder which was at the most six 
months old at the time of shipment. The mobilization 
regulation authorized powder up to nine and a half 
months old. DG VI argued that stocks did not make it 
possible to supply more recent powder. In fact, the 
stocks of powder less than six months old at no time 
dropped below 5 515 t, and it was possible to make 
up the 5 000 t by calling on only two Member States 
(United Kingdom 3 1401; Denmark 1 9001; the 
remaining 475 t were located in Germany). 
2.7. Situations of this kind sometimes occur because no 
one document serves as the basic common point of 
reference for all the parties concerned. The supply 
agreement is binding upon the recipient and the 
Community. The mobilization regulation is aimed at the 
intervention agency and the contractor. Two separate 
documents are therefore involved, drawn up by two 
separate Directorates-General. A third liaison document, 
the mobilization request, ought to ensure that these two 
documents are consistent with each other, but this is not 
always the case. 
The regulations on the mobilization of aid 
Sphere of application 
2.8. Rules for mobilizing aid have been drawn up for 
cereals (Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80) (
4) and for milk 
products (Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83) (
s), but there are 
no equivalent regulations for vegetable oils, sugar or 'other 
products'. This serious shortcoming is compensated for by 
provisions inserted on an ad hoc basis in each notice of 
invitation to tender relating to these products, but this 
cannot be a substitute for a properly thought-out, 
permanent regulation. 'Delivered place of destination' 
deliveries are customary for all categories of products and 
yet Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80 on the mobilization of 
cereals makes no mention of them. 
Complexity 
2.9. A feature of the mobilization of food aid is the 
repetition in regulations issued for a particular, limited 
purpose of provisions . that are permanent and 
general. Admittedly, for cereals delivered at the FOB or 
CIF stages, and for milk products, the mobilization rules 
have been codified. In all other cases, however, the rules 
are reiterated in each mobilization regulation or notice of 
invitation to tender in exactly the same terms (nature of the 
quality controls, list of documents which the successful 
tenderer has to supply in order to be paid, rules regarding 
the packaging, compulsory lodging of a security, etc.). 
Conversely, separating general rules from specific 
provisions and incorporating them in different legislation 
should not be taken to ridiculous lengths: a mistake in the 
markings on bags of milk was due to a special regulation, 
requiring that the bags be marked 'to the Republic of 
Tunisia'. This requirement was in addition to the words 
'Gift of the European Economic Community', which are 
stipulated as a general rule by Regulation (EEC) 
No 1354/83 (
s) on the mobilization of milk products. The 
bags bore only the marking — itself improperly 
abbreviated — 'Gift of the EEC. 
2.10. The regulations are complex in another way too: 
some provisions relating to the agricultural policy apply to 
food aid but to an extent which varies from case to case. 
The standards as regards quality and packaging that must 
be observed when a product is taken into intervention are 
numerous and this is to the advantage of food aid if the 
product is drawn from intervention stocks. Furthermore, 
some of these standards apply to some of the food-aid 
products mobilized on the market (e. g. milk products). 
Homogeneity 
2.11. Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80 (
4) (cereals) and 
Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 (
s) (milk products) differ in 
many ways that are likely to be of relevance with regard to 
questions of quality, and which, for the most part, cannot 
be justified by reference to the nature of the products 
themselves (see Annex 2). 
Content 
Packaging 
2.12. In the case of butteroil, no stipulations are made 
concerning the shape of the canisters nor the thickness or 
weight of the sheet metal from which they are made. 
Experience has made it abundantly clear that the most 
commonly-used canister, which has a 5 kg capacity, is not 
sturdy enough. The checks made on the strength of the 
cartons containing these canisters are inadequate and the 
cartons frequently arrive damaged and open. The 
stipulation as to the water-resistance of the glue used does 
not guarantee that it will also be long-lasting. No provision 
is made for securing the cartons with metal hoops. The 
Commission will succeed in preventing damage only by 
laying down technical specifications, defined after 
investigating the cases of damage. 17. 8. 87  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 219/7 
2.13. As regards the milk-powder bags, Regulation (EEC) 
No 1354/83 (
5) quite simply refers back to the provisions 
of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 625/78 (
10) of 
30 March 1978 on public storage of skimmed-milk powder 
in the Community. The conditions prevailing overseas do 
not make it possible simply to use the same packaging as is 
specified for Europe. 
2.14. For vitaminized milk, Regulation (EEC) No 
1354/83 (
5) provides for the possibility of shipping the 
powder in 1-kg or 2-kg sachets packed in lots of 20 kg. 
This method is better but is little used, and it clearly cannot 
compare with the method adopted by Switzerland and the 
United States, which is to use tins containing between 2 kg 
and 5 kg. ' 
Markings 
2.15. As regards the markings on the packages, some 
defects can be attributed to the contractors, as in cases 
where the words 'Gift of the European Economic 
Community to (name of country)' or the product's date of 
manufacture are missing. It is the regulations that are at 
fault, however, for failing to specify the instructions for use 
and the last date for consumption for milk products. 
Transport 
2.16. The stipulation 'Community port of shipment with 
regular connections with the country of destination', which 
DG VIII was trying to make compulsory in its mobilization 
requests at the FOB stage, was often curtailed in the 
mobilization regulations to 'Community port'. It was 
therefore left up to the contractor to select the port and the 
recipient sometimes had to charter a ship to transport the 
goods from this port. A new clause was inserted into the 
milk products Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 (
5); 'This 
port shall be selected because of the existence of a 
connection with the country of destination during the 
shipment period specified in the notice of invitation to 
tender. This connection may involve one transhipment in 
another European Community port'. This clause, which 
does not appear in the cereals Regulation (EEC) No 
1974/80 (
4), is included in every mobilization regulation 
relating to an FOB delivery of cereals. The fact still remains 
that it is the contractor who unilaterally selects the port of 
shipment. This choice may affect the costs borne by the 
recipient just as much as, and probably more than, it 
affects those which the contractor has to pay, and may thus 
reduce the net economic value of the aid. 
2.17. Similarly, the stipulations regarding sanitary 
conditions and the age of the ships are laid down only for 
the CIF stage and not for the 'delivered place of destination' 
stage. The Commission should take steps to eliminate the 
many unscrupulous shipowners whose prices appear to be 
competitive only because of the dangerous conditions 
under which they transport goods and the deplorable state 
of the ships they transport them in, or because of dumping 
practices on the part of some countries. 
3. Monitoring the application of the rules 
3.1. The following checks exist to safeguard the quality of 
food aid and to ensure that it conforms with the rules: 
(a) procedure for approving the contractor; 
(b) procedure for approving the manufacturer of the 
product; 
(c) supervision of manufacture of the product; 
(d) the Member State's health check; 
(e) check to determine whether goods may enter 
intervention stores; 
(f) quality control carried out by the contractor; 
(g> customs check on the quantity; 
(h) quality control with a view to shipment, conducted on 
the initiative of the intervention agency; 
(i) the recipient's quality control with a view to shipment; 
and, in some cases: 
(j) a check at the time of unloading; 
(k) a check upon arrival at the destination. 
3.2. Some checks are specific to food aid — for example, 
those referred to under (a), (f), (h), (i) and, when they 
aPPty>(j) and (k). Food-aid operations are subject to the 
other checks that apply under the ordinary law of the 
Member States or of the Community. This applies to the 
checks mentioned under (d), (e) and (g). Depending on the 
case, the checks referred to under (b) and (c) may or may 
not be specific to food aid. 
Non-specific checks 
Adequacy of the non-specific checks 
Lack of sufficient evidentiary effect 
3.3. The evidentiary effect of the non-specific checks is 
sometimes questionable. They are not carried out with the 
active involvement of the other parties concerned, insofar 
as the recipient is not party to, nor even present at, the No C 219/8  Official Journal of the European Communities  17. 8. 87 
check. With the exception of the customs check, moreover, 
all these checks are no longer up-to-date by the time of 
shipment. A quality certificate rapidly becomes out of date. 
This applies to the health checks carried out by the 
Member States with reference to their own standards. 
Furthermore, the results of these health checks in the 
Member States are sometimes shown to be incorrect by 
other subsequent checks. 
3.4. Products to be drawn from intervention stocks are 
subject to the standards and the checks required for entry 
into the intervention stores, where such standards and 
checks exist, which is not always the case: 
(a) as regards cereals, there is no requirement that they 
should be subject to a full check before being taken 
into store. Samples taken by both parties have to be 
submitted for analysis by an approved laboratory only 
'where agreement as to the quality and characteristics 
of the cereal offered cannot be reached'. Conversely, if 
agreement is reached, no provision is made for a 
laboratory analysis; 
(b) for milk products, the procedure for approving the 
manufacturer constitutes an initial form of screening 
and a second screening is carried out through checks 
during the process of manufacture. But this does not 
apply to butter, which is produced by too large a 
number of farmers and cooperatives. When it is taken 
into store, samples are usually taken to check whether 
it conforms to quality standards. In addition, butter 
has to undergo a trial storage period of two months, 
after which, if quality standards are not met, it is 
rejected. 
3.5. The Court's investigations into the quality of 
products in store cast doubt on whether all these checks are 
carried out (see the Court's annual report on the financial 
year 1985, Chapter 4). Furthermore, three comments must 
be made: 
(a) once the product has been taken into store, the 
regulations do not provide for subsequent regular 
checks; 
(b) by the time it is mobilized, the product may have 
deteriorated; 
(c) instances of poor quality are most frequent where the 
product comes from intervention stocks. 
3.6. The Commission became so concerned about this 
that it decided systematically to finance checks concerned 
specifically with supplies drawn from intervention stocks; 
the results were striking (see paragraph 3.30 below), thus 
providing proof a contrario that the checks carried out 
prior to entry into intervention stores are not sufficient. 
3.7. The customs check on quantities that is supposed to 
be made prior to shipment covers no more than 0,8 %, 
1 % or 2 % of the total quantities exported (
n). 
Failure to take account of requirements peculiar 
to food aid 
3.8. The requirements regarding food aid are stricter than 
the rules applying under common law. For cereals and rice, 
the stipulated standards as regards quality are sometimes 
higher than the minimum conditions required for entry into 
intervention. The bags used for milk powder are sometimes 
different from those specified in the common agricultural 
policy regulations, and for cereals, which are usually stored 
in bulk, the process of putting them in bags is part of the 
act of mobilization. Lastly, the markings are specific to 
food aid. Thus, even if they were always reliable in 
themselves, the non-specific checks would not be adequate, 
because they do not take account of the requirements that 
are peculiar to food aid. The regulations do not always 
arrange for these checks to be supplemented by specific 
checks. 
Complementarity tenth the specific checks 
The approval of the manufacturer 
3.9. There is no approval procedure for cereals. For milk 
products, things are somewhat complex: 
(a) the process of manufacture may be in two stages: 
(i) first stage: manufacture of butter or of 
skimmed-milk powder; 
(ii) second (possible) stage: processing of the butter 
into butteroil; 
(b) normally, vitamins are added to the powder during its 
manufacture and the two stages are then inseparable. 
3.10. For the first stage of manufacture, the current 
provisions do not always have the same scope: 
(a) where the product has been purchased on the market, 
Article 3 (
3) of Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 (
5) 
refers back to the approval procedure for entry into 
intervention stocks. But it goes on to say that 'only 
undertakings which have the appropriate technical 
facilities for meeting the requirements laid down in 
this Regulation) (i. e. laid down specifically for food 
aid) 'may be approved'; 
(b) if they have been drawn from intervention stocks, the 
food-aid products automatically benefit from the 
approval procedure for the entry into store. But this 
does not mean that they necessarily 'meet the 
requirements' specific to food aid. Since the 
regulations on food aid are stricter than the general 
regulations, the possibility that they may fall short of 
the requirements does exist. 17. 8. 87  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 219/9 
3.11. The approval of the manufacturer carrying out the 
second processing stage is not laid down any more 
uniformly by the regulations: 
(a) for butteroil (manufactured almost solely for food 
aid), the approval procedure is specific and includes a 
stipulation requiring 'appropriate technical facilities 
for meeting the requirements' peculiar to food aid; 
(b) in the case of the vitaminization of skimmed-milk 
powder, the Regulation contains no provision 
corresponding to that for butteroil. This omission 
could appear to be due to a simple oversight. 
3.12. If there is an infringement of the conditions on 
which approval was granted, approval is temporarily or 
permanently withdrawn. This rather complex set of 
provisions results in a legal structure that lacks 
homogeneousness and certainty. One of the main 
consequences is that manufacturers supplying food aid 
from intervention stocks are not required to observe the 
approval conditions peculiar to food aid. 
Manufacturing supervision 
3.13. In respect of milk products, manufacturing 
supervision is specific and systematic only in the case of 
butteroil and the vitaminization of skimmed-milk powder. 
For butter, no manufacturing supervision is required by the 
Comunity regulations. For milk powder, Regulation (EEC) 
No 1354/83 (
s) extends the manufacturing supervision 
that is stipulated for products taken into intervention to 
products purchased on the market. 
3.14. These inspections at the first manufacturing stage, 
being provided for by a common agricultural policy 
regulation, are not specific to the field of food aid. They 
are periodic, 'frequent', as the Regulation specifies, but not 
systematic, i. e. they are not carried out for all the batches. 
So in no way can they be considered to confer a guarantee 
of quality on every supply of food aid. 
3.15. Checks on whether the raw materials used are solely 
milk or the permitted constituents of milk can only be 
carried out during manufacture. The laboratories say that, 
on the basis of existing analyses, it is impossible to 
establish with absolute accuracy whether or not the 
finished butteroil contains vegetable fats. From the point of 
view of the production cost, it is very tempting to substitute 
vegetable oil for butter: in 1986, vegetable oil was fetching 
about 1 100 ECU/tonne and butter 3 100 ECU/tonne. 
The same factors apply the skimmed-milk powder and to 
powdered whey. -
3.16. Certain precautions are taken when approving the 
undertakings. For skimmed-milk powder, the production 
plant cannot be granted approval unless it undertakes to 
keep permanent records listing the origin of the raw 
materials, the quantities treated and produced, the type of 
manufacturing process and the identification of each lot 
produced. Similarly, for the manufacture of butteroil, 
'approval may be granted only to undertakings which have 
. . . premises where any stocks of non-butter fats may be 
kept separately and identified'. 
3.17. But even if the plant clearly separates the 
production rooms and lines relating to authorized products 
from those relating to other products, checks would still 
have to be made to ensure that there was no fraudulent 
interference during the process of manufacture and that no 
fraud had been committed in keeping the records. In order 
to be effective, these checks, even if they are not systematic, 
need at least to be unexpected and to be carried out at any 
time. An occasion has already occurred when, during a 
check on an undertaking manufacturing butteroil, the 
Court of Auditors chanced to find a large number of empty 
drums of vegetable oil on the premises. In order to ascertain 
what the oil had been used for, it would have been 
necessary either to have been present when it was utilized 
or else to have carried out a close examination of the 
commercial documents. A contractor .who had committed a 
fraud of this type was identified by the Commission in 
connection with deliveries made in 1976 and 1977, but no 
financial sanctions were applied at the time of clearance. A 
Court audit visit to Indonesia found one case in which it 
was likewise suspected that vegetable fat had been used in 
making milk powder. 
3.18. Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 (
5) lays 
down very generally that 'Member States shall take the 
measures necessary to ensure that ... there is no fat other 
than butterfat in the products supplied' as food aid. The 
contractor undertakes, if the product is drawn from 
intervention stocks, 'to manufacture the butteroil to be 
supplied only from the butter removed from the 
intervention agency for that purpose'. All this offers only a 
theoretical guarantee. 
3.19. Above all, manufacturing supervision is in many 
cases inadequate. These checks relate solely to the nature of 
the raw materials assumed to be used in manufacturing the 
product and the quantities produced, and also to the 
conformity of the packaging and marking, but do not 
usually include chemical and microbiological analyses of 
the final product. 
Quality control at the time of or with a view to 
shipment 
3.20. For cereals, this control is always obligatory. This 
does not apply to milk products, for which quality control 
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(a) where the product is purchased on the market; 
(b) in the case of the vitaminization of powder or the 
processing of butter into butteroil. 
Thus, in respect of a product of first-stage processing — 
butter, non-vitaminized skimmed-milk powder — drawn 
from intervention stocks, no quality control is as a rule 
provided for prior to shipment. 
3.21. Of course, if the recipient is not represented at the 
time of shipment of an FOB or CIF delivery to hand over 
the taking-over certificate (which must certify that the 
goods are of the quality specified) to the contractor, the 
intervention agency must act in his place and issue a 
certificate with the same content as a taking-over 
certificate. This means that the intervention agency must 
check that the goods are of the quality specified, even in the 
case of milk products drawn from intervention stocks. 
However, in the case of an FOB or CIF delivery at which 
the recipient is represented and does not ask for a check to 
be carried out, and in the case of a 'delivered place of 
destination' delivery for which the certificate does not have 
to be issued at shipment, there is no quality control with a 
view to shipment. 
Specific checks 
Approval of contractors 
3.22. No milk products may be supplied as food aid 
except by an approved undertaking, whether it 
manufactures the product or merely trades in or transports 
it. For cereals, no provision is made for approving die 
supplier. This omission has made it possible for one and 
the same contractor to make successive deliveries of 
15 0001 of maize not of the specified quality to 
Mozambique, 8 0001 of maize not of the specified quality 
to Burkina Faso and several other consignments of maize of 
a quality disputed by the recipients. 
The quality control carried out by contractors 
3.23. For cereals, the contractor is not obliged to carry 
out any checks on the goods supplied to him. For milk 
products, he must verify the quantities made available to 
him and the quality of the packaging. There is no mention 
of the quality of the products, except in the case of 
butteroil, where the interested parties may examine the 
butter before committing themselves. No reason is given to 
justify this difference of treatment. 
3.24. Of course, there is nothing to stop contractors 
carrying out their own quality controls, but such controls 
would be at their own expense. A contractor does not feel 
the need to make such controls as much as he would in the 
case of a commercial transaction, where the purchaser has 
an obvious interest in ensuring that the merchandise is of 
good quality, since, if not, his client will hold him 
responsible. In a food-aid operation, the recipient, who 
plays the role of client, does not have the same power of 
inflicting a penalty as someone who is paying for the goods 
he receives. Furthermore, a poor country is not in a good 
position to take strong, effective action in European 
business relations. Moreover, there is the practical 
difficulty posed by the (sometimes extraordinary) dispersal 
of the warehouses from which one and the same lot has to 
be drawn. In the case of milk products delivered to Tunisia 
in 1983, 4211 of butter had to be taken from three 
different warehouses situated in two French departments 
that did not border on each other and 1 000 t of milk 
powder from five different warehouses spread out over the 
whole of France. 
The quality control carried out at the initiative of the 
intervention agency at the time of or with a view to 
shipment 
3.25. This quality control is carried out for cereals with 
the participation of both parties involved: The successful 
tenderer and the recipient's representative shall be invited 
to take part in the operation'. No such provision is made in 
respect of milk products and even in the case of cereals the 
sense of the word 'participer', used in the French version of 
the Regulation, needs to be clarified in certain language 
versions. The English 'take part' is a good rendering. The 
German 'teilnehmen' and Danish 'deltage' terms are 
likewise satisfactory. The Italian word 'presenziare' and the 
Dutch expression 'aanwezig zijn', on the other hand, have 
the much weaker meaning of 'be present at'. 
3.26. Other differences between cereals and milk 
products: 
(a) for cereals, the intervention agency 'arranges for' the 
check, which is entrusted to an independent 
laboratory; for milk products, the agency itself 
'checks', which does not offer the same guarantee of 
objectivity; 
(b) the checks are usually made at the port. The checks on 
vitaminized milk powder and on butteroil may be seen 
as identical to manufacturing supervision, the 
shortcomings of which have already been described. 
And by the time of shipment, this out-of-date check 
has lost some of its value. 
3.27. In several cases, some intervention agencies have 
failed to apply the regulations correctly: 
(a) for 5001 of milk powder delivered to China in 
November 1981, the Belgian intervention agency did 
not carry out the stipulated inspection to ascertain 
that the product satisfied requirements; 
(b) the quality control at shipment of 15 0001 of maize 
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Commission was performed by the French 
intervention agency itself: 
(i) it should have been carried out by independent 
laboratories. In the context of the infringement 
procedure brought against France for this 
mobilization, the Commission overlooked this 
point; 
(ii) the agency declared that the goods were of the 
required quality, taking as its reference the 
minimum quality standards stipulated for entry 
into intervention, which are less strict than the 
applicable standard-quality rules; 
(Hi) the only excuse given by the intervention agency 
in its own defence was that the mobilization 
regulation did not specify that the maize had to 
be 'fit for human consumption'. This Regulation, 
which was similar to all the previous regulations, 
referred, as they did, to 'food aid' and to the 
general regulations on food aid, which specify, 
as if it were really necessary, that the aid is 
supplied 'for humanitarian purposes' in order 'to 
raise the standard of nutrition of the recipient 
peoples', thus
-ruling out any confusion with the 
supply of feedingstuffs for cattle. 
3.28. The large number of instances of poor quality 
detected in goods that have, however, been certified as 
complying with the required standards, suggests that, in 
many cases, this attestation by the intervention agency is 
issued without thorough checks, because the recipient is 
hot present at the time of shipment. 
1981 to 1983). Particularly in the case of milk products 
from intervention, it has decided to become involved in the 
checks by financing them itself more often. According to 
the Commission, this has resulted in a considerable 
decrease in the number of complaints about poor quality. 
3.31. Certain intervention agencies have since hindered 
the execution of such checks, alleging that there is no legal 
basis entitling the Commission to carry out quality controls 
in its own name. The Commission has responded by 
deciding in future to finance checks which will be carried 
out on the recipients' behalf and at their request, and no 
longer in its own name. The supply agreements have been 
amended in order to inform the recipients of this change 
and the Directorate-General for Development has been 
called upon to make the recipient countries aware of this 
option. Even if these are not the sole measures to be taken 
in the area of quality control, they should already involve 
the recipient to a greater extent in the monitoring of the 
implementation of the aid and greatly reduce the incidence 
of cases of poor quality. The intervention agencies, 
however, have already indicated their opposition in this 
case too, despite the existence of an undeniable legal 
justification, at least in respect of milk products. 
3.32. The Court of Auditors cannot stress too strongly 
how much it would like to see the Commission pursue the 
course of incrased checks, by proposing an amendment to 
the legislation which would explicitly allow it also to carry 
out checks in its own name. 
The checks reguested by the recipient 
Common observations in respect of checks with a view to 
shipment 
3.29. For milk products, the recipient can require that, 
prior to shipment, the quality, quantity and packaging of 
the goods supplied be checked. If the recipient then 
disputes the goods, the intervention agency arranges for a 
second check to be made, the results of which are final. For 
cereals, the regulations only allow the recipient the 
possibility of taking part in the quality control arranged by 
the intervention agency. He may challenge the results. This 
leads to a second, decisive control, which must be 
performed by a different laboratory. Until recently, the 
recipient was rarely represented at the time of shipment. He 
was not made aware in the supply agreement of the power 
granted him by the regulations. And the costs relating to 
the requested inspections were to be borne by the losing 
party, which was likely to cause quite a few recipients to 
hesitate before asking for checks to be made. But this 
situation has recently changed, now that the Commission 
itself is financing checks. 
The checks financed by the Commission 
3.30. The Commission is now using a larger proportion 
(64% of 1,7 Mio ECU in 1985) of the appropriations 
which have been reserved for quality controls but which 
have remained unused for a long time (less than 10 % from 
Shipment, the decisive stage of quality control 
3.33. In comparison with all the upstream controls, the 
checks carried out with a view to shipment are of prime 
importance. They constitute the 'safety net' designed to 
check that the supplies satisfy not only general standards of 
hygiene but also the provisions specific to the aid in 
question, such as tonnage, specific characteristics of the 
products and their packaging. Their significance may also 
be appreciated in relation to all the subsequent downstream 
stages of aid implementation. With regard to the 'delivered 
place of destination' stage (*), although the quality is 
assessed finally on arrival at destination, the checks at the 
time of loading aim to remove immediately all goods that 
do not comply at this stage. In respect of aid financed only 
as far as the port of shipment (
7) or port of unloading (»), 
which is by far the largest amount, discharge (
12) is given to 
the European agents involved at the moment of shipment, 
and in particular to the contractor, who is entided to 
demand full payment for his services immediately 
afterwards. 
3.34. This has not always been the case. Under the 
former Regulation (EEC) No 303/77 of 14 February 
1977 (
,3) laying down rules for the mobilization of milk 
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unloading, the delivery had been made and the risks passed 
from the successful tenderer to the recipient at the time of 
unloading. Moreover, in the case of financing as far as the 
port of shipment, it was not the commercial notion of 
FOB(
7) which applied but that of FAS (
14). The 
Commission has changed this system in order to bring it 
into line with current commercial practices and current 
interpretations of the terms FOB and CIF (
7) (
8). 
3.38. It is in fact unthinkable that a boat should patiently 
await these results before sailing. Very often the boat leaves 
before the results of the first inspection are made known 
and is far away when the results of the second, 'final' 
inspection (the check provided for by the regulations in the 
event that the results of the first check should be contested) 
are obtained. 
Excessive importance attached to taking-over or 
compliance certificates on shipment 
3.35. The decisive importance, from the legal point of 
view, that is attached to the checks and taking-over 
procedure on shipment is not justified. Firstly, the checks 
carried out with a view to shipment are not complete and 
are not always reliable (see paragraphs 3.20, 3.21 and 
3.25—3.28). Moreover, the recipient bears all the 
consequences of any incidents which may arise after 
shipment, even when the Community is financing the 
transaction as far as the moment of unloading. This 
approach is understandable within the framework of 
commercial exports, where the purchaser can penalize the 
seller for any shortcomings by refusing to pay for the 
delivery or by changing to another supplier in future. Such 
economic weapons are not, however, available to recipients 
of food aid. There is thus not much point in bringing the 
delivery stages of food aid into line with commercial 
practices. 
3.36. That is not all. The system of issuing taking-over 
certificates on shipment is based on the pretence that the 
results of the checks are drawn up and notified immediately 
to the interested parties, making it possible for the recipient 
(or the intervention agency) to issue the taking-over 
certificates (or compliance certificates) in full knowledge of 
the facts, 'immediately after loading'. This is far from what 
happens in reality. It takes several days, even several 
weeks, for the results of quality controls, especially those in 
respect of milk products, to be notified by the laboratories 
to the intervention agencies. 
3.37. The same applies when it is the recipient who makes 
a special request for a check. The timetable for the dispatch 
of 1 000 t of skimmed-milk powder and 345 t of butteroil 
delivered to Tunisia under the 1982 programme is 
instructive in this respect: 
— taking of samples . on behalf of 
Tunisia 8. 11. 1983 
— Tunisia asks the Central Laboratory of 
Food Hygiene (France) to carry out 
analyses: 10. 11. 1983 
— shipment at Antwerp: 14. 11. 1983 
— issue of taking-over certificates: 14. 11. 1983 
— unloading in Tunis: 29. 11. 1983 
— results of the analyses available: 12. 12. 1983 
3.39. The argument that these taking-over and 
compliance certificates have unqualified discharge value is 
thus untenable. They should contain a compliance clause, 
subject to any concealed defects, which may be called into 
question in the light of tests results that are of genuine 
scientific value. Moreover, case law in the commercial 
field, which is less strict than the Community legislation 
relating to food aid, points in this direction. It lays down 
that, in the case of CIF or FOB sales, the acceptance of 
goods on loading may be called into question at the time of 
arrival at destination if the poor quality of the goods in 
question was not detectable by means of an ordinary 
examination before the ship put to sea. The intervention 
agencies' experts acknowledge that it is impossible to carry 
out the present system of quality controls at the time of 
loading. Under the current legislation, the taking-over and 
compliance certificates, instead of providing effective 
protection of the recipient's interests, serve rather to 
prqvide the contractor with instant documents with which 
to claim payment for his services. 
Control and monitoring of implementation after shipment 
3.40. The legislation in force does not provide for any 
check at the time of unloading, whatever the stage of 
delivery. However the Court has noted that, over several 
years, the practice has gradually been introduced of making 
indiscriminate checks on all products with Community 
financing in the following conditions and in the following 
cases: 
(a) on behalf of the recipient, it has become general 
practice for checks to be carried out at the time of 
shipment; 
(b) in relation to CIF deliveries, selective checks have been 
carried out at the port of unloading in the case of 
destinations which present specific risks; 
(c) in relation to delivered place of destination deliveries, 
systematic checks have been carried out at the place of 
destination, whenever material conditions have 
allowed; 
(d) for triangular operations, in all cases the contracts 
provided for checks at the time of shipment and on 
arrival. 
i. e. 28 days after the boat had set sail and 13 days even Checks at the point of arrival should be prescribed 
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3.41. It would be all the more necessary to lay down in 
detail the procedure applicable to these checks as the local 
conditions under which they are effected are more 
uncertain in countries where the European intervention 
agencies have no locus standi, where well equipped and 
reputable laboratories are rather rare and governments do 
not always know how to take the immediate precautions 
necessary in their own interests: 
(a) the Mozambican authorities were caught unawares 
when it was established that part of the 1983 delivery 
of maize was sub-standard (see paragraph 3.27) and 
the various checks they carried out were so 
disorganized that, though there was no doubt that the 
quality was seriously below standard, it proved 
impossible to measure it accurately, despite the 
despatch on the spot of a Commission official in 
October 1984 to take part in the enquiry; 
(b) in Bangladesh the control tests carried out do not 
observe the same quality criteria as the checks 
provided for by the Community. There is a risk that 
this may make them unsuitable as a basis for 
complaint; 
(c) if the complaint is at all late, it is no longer possible 
for a control team to decide how much damage was 
sustained during unloading and how much further 
damage occurred as a result of handling and storage 
conditions in the country. This comment was made by 
the adviser at the Delegation in Tunisia, who had 
come to inspect some milk powder, the quality of 
which had deteriorated and which was nevertheless 
stored by the Tunisians in very humid premises. The 
adviser had arrived on the day following the 
complaint, which was made by the Tunisian 
authorities on 21 February 1984, whereas the milk 
had arrived almost three months earlier. 
3.42. In general, the Commission's monitoring of the 
implementation of the aid from shipment to final 
distribution leaves much to be desired. There is no 
justification for the taking-over certificates not being 
centralized so that they can all be checked by the same 
Commission department. The Commission delegates in the 
recipient countries are not sufficiently involved in the in 
situ implementation of the food aid and are not adequately 
informed by the Commission of impending arrivals, even 
though the contractors are obliged to inform them of the 
expected date of arrival of vessels at the port of shipment. 
To this may be added the inadequacy, or even absence, of 
reports on the implementation of the aid, which the 
recipients are, however, bound to compile in accordance 
with the supply agreements — and in this respect even 
organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) 
are not beyond, reproach. The argument that, except in 
cases of goods 'delivered place of destination', the 
Commission is no longer responsible for transport 
downstream of the port of unloading and is never 
responsible for distribution, is quite untenable. The 
Community cannot wash its hands of the final outcome of 
its own measures. 
4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND GUARANTEES 
Unequal value of the various delivery stages as regards 
quality 
4.1. Responsibilities and guarantees are demarcated and 
defined differently at each stage of delivery. For this reason 
the various stages are not of equal value from the point of 
view of the heed for quality. 
4.2. The FOB stage is the most consistent in this respect, 
but it leaves the recipient fully responsible for organizing 
the chartering and unloading of the ship, transport by land 
to the destination and insuring the product. While this 
stage perfectly suits some countries, on account of their 
administrative and commercial traditions, another stage 
would undoubtedly be more suitable for other countries, to 
which the Community at present only delivers its aid up to 
the FOB stage. Moreover the latter stage, like all the other 
stages, has weaknesses in respect of the check carried out at 
the moment of shipment (see paragraphs 3.35—3.39 
above) which cannot be accepted. 
4.3. The 'delivered place of destination' stage involves the 
greatest amount of 'technical assistance' for all operations 
organized up to arrival at destination. Only the distribution 
operations have to be organized by the recipient. This stage 
may thus be recommended for the poorest countries and 
for land-locked countries, which is in line with the criteria 
currently adopted. This delivery stage should, nevertheless, 
be improved as regards quality control and reception at 
destination (see paragraph 3.40 above) and also as regards 
the necessary introduction of a proper reception procedure 
for the goods with both parties present and open to 
challenges by either side. The Commission's on-the-spot 
delegation should also be involved in this procedure, as is 
the case for supply contracts within the framework of 
investment projects financed by the Community (see 
paragraph 5.15 below). The validity of this stage therefore 
depends on whether analyses can be carried out in reliable 
laboratories in the country of destination, a condition 
which, unfortunately, is not always met. 
4.4. The CIF system is perfectly acceptable in the context 
of normal commercial relations where an operation takes 
place between two partners who have been party to the 
contract from the outset and the person receiving the goods 
has every possibility of defending his own interests. 
However, the CIF system becomes inappropriate as soon as 
it is applied to food aid. In this case the recipient state is 
not a party to the contract since the contract is signed 
between an intervention body, acting on behalf of the 
Community, and an operator. Furthermore the recipient 
state is hardly in a position to make sure that the contract is 
enforced. In practice, it is left to a public service employee 
who has little experience of commercial practices. It is 
difficult for the recipient state to dispute the quality of the 
product since the quality is supposed to have already been 
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certificate was drawn up, even in the absence of a 
representative from the recipient state. Although the goods 
are transferred to the recipient state as from the time of 
loading, it has even less chance of calling into question the 
maritime transport methods and the insurance of the 
product, since, from the outset, they are the responsibility 
of the operator. Furthermore, in order to claim against the 
insurance, the recipient must prove that an incident has 
occurred during transport, and this is very difficult. 
Finally, the CIF option does not automatically make the 
supplier responsible for unloading costs, since the 
inclusion, or not, of these costs in the charter contract 
depends on the prevailing policy as regards chartering. 
Some ports usually exclude these costs from the contracts. 
The Community legislation, however, aims in fact to 
guarantee 'CIF-landed' (.") conditions, which always 
include unloading costs. This ambiguity has resulted in 
legal disputes. On the whole, use of the CIF system for the 
delivery of food aid to a distant and underdeveloped 
country seems inappropriate in view of the actual 
conditions in which the system operates. ' 
Obligations, guarantees and penalties at the various 
stages 
The economic operator's obligations 
The contractor's obligation to implement the 
aid 
4.5. The contractor is obliged to render the service for 
which he has been awarded the contract. For this purpose, 
the legislation lays down that: 
(a) once submitted, tenders may not be withdrawn; 
(b) a successful tenderer may not withdraw from his 
undertaking to render the service for which he has 
been awarded the contract; 
(c) a successful tenderer may not subcontract his 
contractual obligations; 
(d) where delivery is at the FOB stage, the successful 
tenderer may be granted an extension of up to 60 
days, within which to fulfil his obligations without 
being penalized; 
(e) the tenderers enter into a series of quite varied 
commitments, all with • the aim of observing the ' 
conditions of the invitation to tender and the 
applicable legislation. 
The contractor's obligation to 'reimplement' the 
aid where implementation is unsatisfactory 
4.6. The 'obligation to implement' is covered by an 
'obligation to reimplement' where implementation has been 
unsatisfactory. Where quality does not comply with the 
required standard, the goods must be replaced; where there 
is a shortfall, the deficiency must be made good. 
The intervention agencies' obligations 
4.7. Even if the legislation does not state that the 
intervention agencies act as the Communities' agents in the 
field of food aid, the relations between these agencies and 
the Commission are marked by a series of obligations by 
which the former are bound to the latter: the obligation to 
comply with the statutory provisions; the obligation to pay 
the contractors if the conditions have been satisfied; the 
obligation to inform the Commission of the circumstances 
of any incidents that occur during the mobilization 
procedure; the obligation to obtain the Commission's prior 
agreement in certain cases, in particular for additional 
expenditure not provided for in the contract. 
4.8. The intervention agencies not only have to fulfil their 
own obligations but, also and above all, they have to 
ensure that the contractor's obligations are fulfilled, if 
necessary by calling on existing guarantees. This may even 
be said to be their main responsibility. 
Insurance 
Insurance of cereals withdrawn from intervention 
storage 
4.9. When mobilized goods are withdrawn from 
intervention storage, the tender only contains the transport 
costs and not the purchasing price of the goods made 
available to the successful contractor by the intervention 
agency. The Community pays the intervention agency 
directly in settlement of any expenditure relating to the 
value of the product. The goods withdrawn from 
intervention storage thus need to be covered by a serious 
guarantee. In the case of cereals, this guarantee consists of 
an insurance taken out by the contractor and covering the 
value of the product (the intervention price or, depending 
upon the case, the reference price). In the event of a loss, 
the insurer must pay compensation to the intervention 
agency. This insurance, laid down by Regulation (EEC) 
No 1974/80 (
4) for the FOB and CIF stages, covers the 
goods from the moment when they are received by the 
contractor from the intervention agency to the moment of 
actual shipment. Thereafter, the successful tenderer is in 
fact no longer responsible for the goods and is released 
from his obligations. Moreover, in the event of a CIF 
delivery, the marine transport insurance replaces this first 
insurance. 
Marine transport insurance of products 
delivered CIF 
4.10. With a view to covering the'risks to which goods 
are exposed during transport by sea, the successful tenderer 
for a CIF delivery contract is required to take out an 
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introducing this compulsory insurance requirement into 
Regulations (EEC) Nos 1974/80 (
4) and 1354/83 (
s) 
laying down the general procedures for mobilizing cereals 
and milk products, the Commission aimed to bring 
financing up to the port of unloading into line with 
commercial CIF conditions, where provision is made for 
such insurance. 
Transport insurance at the 'delivered place of 
destination' stage 
4.11. In the case of delivery at the 'delivered place of 
destination' stage, the contractor is required to take out 
'appropriate insurance cover'. 
Securities 
Tendering security 
4.12. The tendering security, which is' stipulated both for 
cereals and milk products, is designed to guarantee that 
tenderers, and subsequently the successful tenderer, fulfil 
their obligations as from the stage when tenders are 
submitted. Since its purpose is not to guarantee the product 
itself but to ensure that the successful tenderer fulfils his 
obligations, the security is a small amount in relation to the 
value of the goods. There are two specific aspects of the 
way the amount is determined which are questionable: 
(a) firstly, in the case of milk products, the amount for 
goods drawn from intervention stocks is not the same 
as that for goods purchased on the Community 
market (1 % of the intervention price in the first case 
and 3 % in the second). This difference is 
unjustified; 
(b) secondly, in the case of cereals, the amount is 'laid 
down in the Regulation opening the tendering 
procedure'. This unjustified difference in relation to 
milk products and the referral to specific regulations 
governing mobilization are examples of the tendency 
to incorporate in successive pieces of legislation 
provisions which are in fact of permanent validity. 
Moreover, in the specific regulations, the security, 
which is fixed in absolute terms and not as a 
percentage, cannot but be different from product to 
product and over time. Such extra complications serve 
no useful purpose. 
The tendering security is released for those tenderers who 
have failed to win the contract, but in the case of the 
successful tenderer it is not released until he has fulfilled his 
obligations up to the agreed stage and has thus fulfilled the 
conditions for being paid. In cases where it is necessary to 
lodge a delivery security, however, (see paragraph 4.13 
below), the latter, when provided, replaces the tendering 
security, which is immediately released. 
Delivery securities 
4.13 It was seen in paragraph 4.9 that when cereals are 
withdrawn from intervention storage they are insured. 
When milk products are mobilized from intervention 
storage the guarantee system is different. The successful 
tenderer is required to lodge a 'delivery security', the 
amount of which is equal to the intervention price of the 
product in question, plus 10 %. The delivery security is 
released when the successful tenderer has fulfilled his 
obligations up to the agreed stage and has thus fulfilled the 
conditions for being paid. 
Securities for advances 
4.14. A tenderer who has been awarded the contract for a 
delivery of products bought on the Community market and 
to be delivered at the 'delivered place of destination' stage 
may, on request, obtain an advance of up to 90 % of the 
amount to be paid for milk products and up to 80 % only 
for cereals. The advance may not be paid, however, until 
after a security has been lodged which is equal to the 
advance or, in the case of milk products, to the value of the 
advance plus 10%. In the case of milk products, the 
security is not released until the whole batch has been 
delivered and payment is due. In the case of cereals, the 
security is released when the successful tenderer has 
furnished proof that that part of the delivery corresponding 
to the advance, i.e. up to 80 % of the lot, has been duly 
delivered. This latter procedure does not take account of 
the indivisible nature of the contract. Indeed, had the 
successful tenderer not received an advance, he would not 
have been able to claim a pro rata payment in respect of a 
partial delivery, since the taking-over certificate may be 
withheld for as long as the delivery has not been 
completed. 
The financial responsibility of the economic operators 
The contractor's financial responsibility 
4.15. The legislation stipulates that 'the successful 
tenderer shall bear all the financial consequences of the 
non-delivery of all or part of the goods under the 
conditions laid down' and that he is only paid in 
proportion to the quantities delivered. The stipulation 
requiring delivery 'under the conditions laid down' makes it 
possible to penalize any deviation from the agreed terms 
and, in particular, any quality defects. 
Deduction from payments made to the successful 
contractor and equivalent guarantee 
4.16v Save for the possibility of paying an advance in the 
case of deliveries at the 'delivered place of destination' 
stage, contractors are not paid until after the contract has 
been fulfilled. If an advance has been paid, the security 
lodged against the advance provides a guarantee equivalent 
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to pay in instalments for milk products, the payments may 
only be in proportion to the parts of the deliveries that have 
been completed. Payment is obviously only due 
unconditionally where a delivery complies to standard. 
Rejection by the Commission of expenditure 
incurred by an intervention agency 
4.17 The Commission may refuse to reimburse to the 
intervention agencies sums that they have wrongly or 
irregularly expended in the implementation of Community 
aid. It may thus penalize an intervention agency which has 
overlooked a delivery that did not comply to standard. 
The Community's guarantee 
4.18. The recipient concludes an agreement solely with 
the Community. It is the latter that undertakes to supply a 
given quantity of products of a certain nature and quality 
and obviously it must honour its commitments. 
Comparative assessment in the light of the quality 
objective 
Who benefits from the guarantee? 
4.19. The obligation to implement and, where necessary, 
to 'reimplement', aid is primarily for the benefit of the 
recipient, as is marine transport insurance in the case'of 
CIF delivery and, last but not least, the Community's 
guarantee. 
4.20. Insurance taken out for intervention cereals 
primarily protects the intervention agency, which will 
receive any sums paid out against the policy, whereas 
insurance for goods 'delivered place of destination' is of 
benefit to the contractor and is of only indirect assistance 
as regards the sound implementation of the aid. The three 
cases where it is compulsory to insure a product, which at 
first sight appear to cover all the stages of transport, thus 
actually represent guarantees of very unequal value, 
especially for the recipient. 
4.21. While the objective of the financial responsibilities 
placed on the contractor and the intervention agency is to 
protect Community resources, the three securities serve 
different purposes. If it is forfeited after the contract has 
been awarded, the tendering security reverts to the 
Community. The objective of the security against advances 
and the delivery security, on the other hand, is to cover an 
intervention agency that has paid an advance or supplied a 
contractor with a product without requiring him to pay for 
it first. But obviously, once the Community has reimbursed 
the intervention agency for the advance or for the value of 
the product, the corresponding security then only exists to 
protect the Community's interests. 
4.22. Some of the obligations placed on the intervention 
agencies aim to ensure that the aid is implemented soundly 
and in the recipient's interest, whilst others aim to protect 
the Community; this is true, for example, of the obligation 
to obtain the Commission's agreement before any 
additional sums are expended. 
4.23. The variety of purposes that these responsibilities 
and guarantees are intended to serve is significant when it 
comes to assessing the overall cohesion of the system. Only 
guarantees which effectively protect the recipient should be 
regarded as essential. 
Full guarantees or guarantees that only cover one stage in 
the implementation of the aid 
A.2A. When FOB or CIF goods are mobilized on the 
market, the conservation and transport of the product up 
to the place of delivery are not necessarily covered by 
insurance, unlike the case of delivery at the 'delivered place 
of destination' stage. Even in this latter case, the obligation 
to take out 'appropriate insurance cover' is vague. More 
specific provisions in respect of the point at which the 
guarantee takes effect and the level of the risks covered 
would be welcome. 
4.25. Except for marine transport insurance in the case of 
CIF delivery, there is no guarantee to cover the proper 
completion of the aid operation downstream of the place 
and after the time of taking-over. The guarantees expire at 
the port of unloading for FOB and CIF deliveries, and the 
'delivered place of destination' stage must be selected if the 
operation is to be covered by a series of guarantees up to its 
arrival at destination. In particular, it is only in the case of 
delivery at the 'delivered place of destination' stage that the 
Commission and intervention agency retain a financial 
guarantee against the contractor up to the moment the 
goods arrive at their destination. The tendering security is 
itself retained up to the same stage (except in the case 
referred to under paragraph 4.12 above). 
4.26. In all the other cases (FOB, CIF), which are by far 
the most frequent, the sum owing to the contractor is paid 
after shipment and he is not required to wait until it has 
been established whether the goods have been unloaded, 
much less whether they have arrived at their destination in 
good condition. The fact is that the contractor is in 
possession of all the documents required for payment just 
after shipment and the securities are released on 
presentation of these same documents. It is very 
unsatisfactory that the goods should thus leave Europe 
without any substantial sum being withheld or guarantee 
being lodged up to the moment of receipt in the beneficiary 
country. For such a guarantee to be meaningful, it would 
have to be combined with a serious procedure for the 
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Guarantees which may be mobilized directly or via a third 
party 
A.27. In general, guarantees whose implementation 
depends upon the cooperation of a third party are of much 
less value than those which may be mobilized directly by 
the holder. Thus, guaranteeing intervention cereals by 
insurance (paragraph 4.9* above) is less certain than 
guaranteeing milk products by the compulsory lodging of a 
security (paragraph 4.13) which cannot be released until 
after satisfactory completion of the services and which 
covers the value plus 10 %. Either the intervention agency 
or the Community assesses whether the conditions for the 
release of the securities have been met, while in the case of 
insurance pay-outs, both parties rely upon the insurance 
companies, who usually are not short of reasons for 
refusing payment, by citing one of the many restrictive 
clauses in the policy. 
4.28. This is the great weakness of marine transport 
insurance in cases of CIF delivery. When insurance 
compensation is sought by the recipient, in most cases the 
companies back out of their responsibilities. In the case of 
15 000 t of maize delivered to Mozambique, a flagrant case 
of poor quality on arrival combined with short weight, the 
insurance company refused to pay up. In the case of 9741 
of wheat flour refused by Djibouti in 1982, the insurance 
company questioned the damage incurred, since the 
recipient had unwisely refused to unload the goods in 
question. 
4.29. Similar difficulties arise when certain aspects of 
food-aid management are delegated in toto to the national 
intervention agencies. On the one hand, the intervention 
agencies, which are intermediaries between the 
Community, the recipient and the successful tenderer, are 
far from taking the view that they are always required to 
defend above all the formers' interests vis-a-vis the latter. 
Some of them sometimes fail to make use of guarantees 
which may be used against defaulting contractors. 
4.30. With regard to an allocation of 2 000 t of milk 
powder to China in 1950, only 5001 of which was 
delivered and which, moreover, was not up to standard, 
the intervention agency reacted very slowly to the news of 
these infractions, which were established in November 
1981. It was not until October 1983 that it informed the 
Commission that it intended to institute legal proceedings 
against the contractor. 
4.31. On the other hand, the Commission was subjected 
to repeated pressures from an intervention agency which 
wanted the penalty imposed on the contractor to be 
quashed. This contractor had loaded food aid onto a boat 
which was older than the authorized age. He falsely 
claimed to have used this boat at the request of the 
Pakistan authorities, whereas in fact he had done so at the 
request of the Pakistani owner of the boat. In addition, 
some of the food aid was missing, so that withholding the 
tendering security was a good means of ensuring that the 
contractor fulfilled the contract. The Commission did not 
give way to these pressures. 
4.32. In a ruling dated 27 November 1986, the Court of 
Justice considered that the contractor was not necessarily at 
fault in making a delivery on a vessel which was over 
15 years old, in contravention of the statutory provisions. 
It also took the view that a certain sense of proportion 
should be kept between the penalty and the offence, and 
that, consequently, in cases of infringements of this type, 
only a part of the security lodged by the contractor 
deserved to be forfeited to the Community. The practical 
implications of this approach corroborate the Court of 
Auditor's findings on the ineffectiveness of the current 
system of securities. 
4.33. Where a contractor has defaulted, or even in cases 
where there is merely doubt as to whether he has correcdy 
fulfilled his contract, responsibility for not paying over or 
releasing the securities and for referring the matter to the 
Commission lies in the first instance with the intervention 
agency. If an intervention agency has acted unwisely and 
paid a defaulting contractor and released his securities, the 
Community may, of course, as a second resort, refuse to 
reimburse the intervention agency. The immediate (that is, 
monthly) screening of expenditure by the intervention 
agencies is, however, of limited use. The intervention 
agencies' monthly statements are most often accepted as 
they are. It is not until several years afterwards, when the 
accounts are cleared, that the Commission makes a more 
thorough check of the agencies' expenditure. Clearance is 
effected purely by means of sampling and takes place long 
after the event. Only the 'additional expenditure' is given 
an immediate and detailed examination which takes place 
at the same time as clearance. This being so, the threat of a 
penalty in connection with the clearance procedure seems 
both slight and remote to the intervention agencies and, a 
fortiori, to the contractors: indeed, should expenditure be 
rejected because the contractor was at fault, die 
intervention agency would be obliged to follow a long and 
uncertain procedure in order to recover the sums that had 
been wrongly paid to the contractor. The back-log in 
clearance operations is currently being reduced. 
Guarantees to maintain the value of the aid or dissuasive 
penalties 
4.34. Obligations and guarantees may serve a dual 
purpose. On the one hand, they may represent the threat of 
a penalty for the contractor — or, where appropriate, for 
the intervention agency — and in this respect they 
constitute a more or less powerful incentive to correct 
performance of the contract. On the other hand, their 
objective may be to maintain or make good the financial 
value of the aid in the event of loss of or damage to the 
product or failure to implement the aid. The obligations 
and guarantees at present adopted 4°
 no
t fulfil both these 
functions. 
4.35. The obligation to implement the aid correctly, and 
the obligation to 'reimplement' where implementation has 
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well have, taken together, a powerful hortatory effect, thus 
encouraging the successful tenderer to perform his contract 
correctly and protecting Community finances against the 
risk of expenditure that fails to produce a definite result. 
Similarly, the delivery security and advance security may 
well represent an almost absolute protection for the 
intervention agency's finances or for those of the 
Community and at the same time a very real financial 
threat for the contractor. The same is not, however, true of 
insurance cover and the tendering security. 
4.36. Insurance covers offers protection — but not very 
good protection — of the interests of the insured party but 
does not constitute an incentive for the contractor. This is 
one of the weaknesses of insurance, as compared with 
securities. Conversely, tendering securities are designed 
solely as an incentive for the tenderers, and subsequendy 
the successful tenderer, to observe their obligations, but 
since they only represent a small percentage of the total 
value of the supply, unlike the other securities, they do not 
have the effect of protecting the financial interest involved 
in the aid. 
Extent, of financial responsibility and definition of 
obligations 
4.37. In theory, financial responsibility is an absolute 
weapon: if the service rendered by the economic operator is 
not up to standard, the Community is in a position to 
penalize him by withholding some or all of the payment. 
This guarantee works in two stages. Firsdy, services which 
have been unsatisfactorily performed must be carried out 
again (see paragraph 4.6 above). Goods of sub-standard 
quality must be rejected and under-weight deliveries must 
be made good. Then, secondly, if the contractor fails to 
fulfil his obligations, financial penalties (refusal to pay or 
withholding of securities) may be imposed. 
4.38. In practice, this system works very badly. On the 
one hand, the obligation to reimplement the aid is not 
systematically enforced. Of all the unsatisfactory deliveries 
recorded, the contractor himself only rectified deficiencies 
in kind in two cases, one of which followed a fraudulent 
supply of butter to Bangladesh. On the other hand, the 
financial penalties are rare and do not by any means reflect 
the number of cases of deficient quality found. There are 
two main reasons why this system does not work properly. 
The first may be ascribed to negligence on the part of the 
beneficiaries of the guarantees. The other, however, is due 
to an inadequate definition of the economic operator's 
obligations. 
Very often the guarantee holder does not put 
the guarantee into effect 
4.39. Deliveries are accepted by the intervention agencies 
despite their non-compliance to standard. Either the 
intervention agency declares that they do comply when 
they do not, as was the case for 15 000 t of maize delivered 
to Mozambique in 1983, or the goods are unloaded despite 
the fact that they have been found not to comply to 
standard. This was the case for 5 000 t of common wheat 
dispatched to Benin under the 1980 programme, in spite of 
the fact that the certificates stated that it was not up to 
standard. This was also the case for 1 0001 of 
skimmed-milk powder delivered in 1983 to Tunisia: in this 
last example the statement of non-compliance had been 
received after shipment (see paragraph 3.37 above). 
4.40. Recipients often fail to make use of the option given 
them by the legislation to take part in the controls at the 
time of shipment or to request that such checks be made 
and to refuse to take the goods over at this stage. Just as 
frequendy, they refrain from submitting any official 
complaint even though it has been established, after the 
arrival of the goods at their destination, that they are of 
poor quality, and they do not even approach the insurers. 
They are hesitant to criticize the quality of a gift and they 
do not always carry out a systematic check when the goods 
arrive. At the time of the Court's audit visit to Ghana in 
January 1985, the Ghanaian authorities had not yet 
submitted, several months after the goods' arrival, any 
claims to the insurers for losses of rice totalling 300 t in 
respect of two batches under the 1983 programme. The 
Commission delegation in Ghana did not react. The 
Tanzanian authorities, who experienced losses of wheat, 
milk powder and butteroil in 1980 and 1981, submitted 
their claim to the Commission, instead of applying to the 
insurers. 
4.41. When, if all goes well, an insurance claim is paid, 
the money must then be used to replace the damaged or 
lost goods. The delivery agreements should make reference 
to this obligation. In Indonesia one NGO which had 
received compensation was authorized by the Commisson 
in 1984 to use the money to organize a seminar to discuss 
ways of improving the utilization of food aid. 
4.42. It must be admitted that even the threat of the 
heaviest financial penalties is not always sufficient to sway 
some particularly unyielding contractors. The amount at 
stake in the case of 1 5001 of skimmed-milk powder 
delivered to China in December 1981 was almost 
1 300 000 ECU. The contractor nevertheless refused to 
complete his contract. In extreme cases oi this kind there 
remains, however, the ultimate weapon of withdrawal of 
approval but it was not used in this case. In general, and as 
far as the Court is aware, it is never used. 
The contractor's obligations are not strict 
enough 
Permitted discrepancies in respect of weight 
4.43. The permitted discrepancy in respect of cereal 
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goods to be delivered in bulk on shipment and 5 % in the 
case of delivered, place of destination supply agreements. 
In the case of a batch of 5 000 t in bags (usual quantity), a 
shortage at destinatipn of 250 t, i.e. 5 000 bags of 50 kg, is 
tolerated. These tolerances wrongly give preference to the 
contractor's interests. Of course, it is true that contractors 
are only paid for the quantities actually delivered, but, so 
long as the shortages stay within the limits authorized by 
the Community, the contractor is considered to have 
fulfilled his contract correctly. The quantity of aid decided 
upon and promised is deemed to have been given and the 
aid programme is deemed to have been carried out. The 
permitted weight discrepancy should be as low as possible 
at the moment of shipment and the contractor could, at a 
pinch, be requested to make up any deficiency. Once the 
goods arrive at destination, the permitted discrepancy 
should be far lower than is allowed at present since the 
transport conditions tend to increase the moisture content 
and thus the weight. 
Cases where the contractor is released from his 
obligations 
4.44. There are two exceptions — not equally justified — 
to the obligation to carry out the aid operation: 
(i) the first does have some foundation. The successful 
tenderer is released from his obligations where the 
recipient has made it impossible to complete the 
delivery on the terms stipulated. Even so, this 
exception must doubtless be qualified. In many cases, 
delivery is still possible, on somewhat amended terms, 
even if it is at the recipient's expense; 
(ii) the second exception — the case of force majeure — 
needs to be looked at critically. The concept of force 
majeure, if interpreted loosely, could be considered to 
include situations normally covered by insurance. 
Admittedly, whenever it is possible to get insurance 
cover against a risk on reasonable terms, the 
Commission does endeavour to reject pleas of force 
majeure. But this eventuality ought to be ruled out by 
the regulations themselves. 
Shortcomings in the regulations as regards the obligation to 
repeat the operation 
4.45. For milk products, the obligation to replace goods 
or to make up a deficiency is specifically stipulated only in 
cases where checks are carried out at the request of the 
recipient, not where they are at the initiative of the 
intervention agency. For aid which is to be delivered CIF, 
where the sea-transport costs are borne by the contractor, 
the legislation stipulates, solely in respect of milk products, 
that 'in the event of default or of unsatisfactory 
transportation the successful tenderer shall, at the 
recipient's request, make all the necessary transport 
arrangements, including charter reservations', 
Obligation to carry out precise operations or obligation to 
achieve a result 
4.46. The obligation to carry out strictly-defined services 
involves one major drawback: in most cases, it makes it 
impossible for the aggrieved party to obtain redress for a 
failure to complete a contract because he is unable to 
produce evidence to show that the failure did indeed relate 
to one of the stipulated services. 
4.47. The example that best illustrates this weakness is 
that of the insurance of the goods during sea transport in 
the case of a CIF supply. The regulations stipulate that the 
insurance must cover all the risks of carriage. In order to 
receive compensation, the recipient therefore has to prove 
that the damage sustained has been caused by an 
occurrence during carriage, which will often be difficult, 
since the carrier is distinctly uninclined to mention hitches 
or accidents which occurred whilst the goods were in his 
hands. 
4.48. Moreover, it is not true that the insurance policies 
cover all the risks of carriage. For example, as a result of 
23 t being missing from a consignment of wheat upon 
arrival at its destination, the Commission found out that in 
France contractors never insure against shortages. The 
'INCOTERMS' document on delivery stages, published by 
the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, excludes, 
unless otherwise specified, insurance cover against risks of 
'theft, pilferage, leakage, breakage, chipping, sweat' and 
'contact with other cargoes', which are regarded as 'special 
risks'. The successful tenderers, given the price of 
comprehensive policies, prefer to sign these standard, 
restrictive policies. Indeed, it would be very expensive to 
demand cover for all these special risks. The regulations 
themselves, whilst on the one hand containing the 
stipulation that all the risks of carriage must be covered, 
seem on the other hand to allow for the possibility of a 
more lenient interpretation by referring in their recitals to 
the Community's wish to align its rules more closely on the 
trading practice described in the 'Incoterms' document. 
4.49. In the case of an FOB, and especially a CIF, 
delivery, the fact that the obligations are divided up 
between the intervention agency, the contractor and the 
shipowner very often makes it impossible for the recipient 
to obtain redress for damage — even where it is undeniable 
— discovered at the time of unloading unless he can with 
certainty attribute the fault or the fraud to one of these 
three parties involved. The case of the 15 0001 of maize 
delivered to Mozambique in 1983 which was incomplete 
and unfit for human consumption is typical in this respect. 
The insurance company and the intervention agency 
managed to show that they had no liability, and the 
contractor was given the benefit of the doubt, pending the 
outcome of an enquiry which has been under way in the 
Member State since November 1984. A series of faulty 
deliveries of the same product to various countries, carried 
out in 1985, highlights the same set of problems. Even in No C 219/20 Official Journal of the European Communities 17. 8. 87 
the case of a faulty delivery at the 'delivered place of 
destination' stage and in the absence of any ad hoc 
procedure (see paragraph 3.40), it is highly unlikely that 
any reaction on the part of the recipient will result in the 
goods being replaced for him. Here again, the recipient 
comes up against the difficulty of producing proof and of 
pinpointing who is responsible. 
4.50. The Community will not escape from these legal 
dead-ends without a reversal of the burden of proof. And 
this can be obtained only by introducing a genuine 
obligation to achieve a result, entrusted to a single supplier 
of services, who has previously been deprived of the 
various existing legal loopholes, with the exception of the 
case of force majeure, itself very strictly delimited. 
The Community's guarantee: the final guarantee or the 
first? 
4.51. Under the agreement made with the recipient, is the 
Community obliged to guarantee that the delivery will be 
made as stipulated, and in the event of a faulty delivery, to 
agree to replace or supplement the goods as necessary, and 
to bear the financial consequences if none of the other 
guarantees can be brought into play? 
4.52. Until recently, the Commission required proof that 
the fault lay with an operator involved in the execution of 
the aid operation before agreeing to make good the damage 
suffered by the recipient and it used this putative liability 
on the part of one of the operators as an excuse for not 
acting sooner. In the case of the 15 0001 of maize for 
Mozambique, the Commission decided that the damage 
suffered would not be made good unless the responsibility 
of the supplier or the insurer was brought into play. In a 
letter to the Mozambican authorities, it says: 'Insofar as the 
latter (the supplier's liability) is involved, the Commission 
will do all it can to obtain redress for the damage suffered 
by your country, but this action cannot be taken before the 
Commission knows how the insurers will deal with the 
claim, and the claim can only be lodged by the aid 
recipient'. Thus, the Commission does not contemplate 
making any direct redress itself. This would have been the 
most advisable course of action, however, especially since 
the delivery stage specified in the supply agreement made 
with the recipient was the port of unloading, the transfer of 
the risks to the recipient taking place only at this port, and 
not at the port of shipment, as implied by the rest of the 
letter, which is doubtless based on the mobilization 
regulation, which contradicts the agreement on this point. 
At one point, the Directorate-General for Development, 
after consulting the Commission's legal service, considered 
replacing 5 0001, which was regarded as a fair assessment 
of the damage suffered^ but then it followed the opinion of 
the Directorate-General for Agriculture, which suggested 
deferring any action until the outcome of an infringement 
enquiry against France was known. Since this enquiry has 
not so far come to a conclusion, it is becoming more and 
more improbable, as time goes by, that the goods will ever 
be replaced. 
4.53. Take the case of sub-standard milk products that 
were delivered to Tunisia in November 1983: that country 
will receive compensation from the Community only if an 
enquiry which the Member State has been asked to make 
establishes that the contractor or the intervention agency is 
liable. The Commission considers 'that the goods can be 
replaced only if it is clearly established, on the one hand, 
that the products were not of the required quality at the 
time of shipment and, on the other, that the responsibility 
for this lies with either the contractor or the agencies 
concerned'. In this case, however, the poor quality of the 
goods prior to shipment has already been established. As 
for the second condition, it is tantamount to ruling put the 
Commission's responsibility. The Commission has 
nevertheless authorized the recipient not to pay any 
counterpart funds for the unusable part of a consignment 
of milk powder. But this exemption obviously does not 
constitute redress of the damage suffered. 
4.54. The Commission's attitude may perhaps be 
changing. In the case of the maize granted to Mozambique, 
the opinion of the Commission's legal service, dated 
6 February 1985, for the first time clearly adopted the 
principle of the Community's direct responsibility in the 
event of a sub-standard delivery. Here are the main 
passages of this opinion: 
'It would seem to have been established that the 
Community has not fulfilled the obligations arising from its 
exchange of letters with Mozambique, according to which 
it undertook to deliver OF 15 000 tonnes of maize, insofar 
as a large part of this delivery proved to be unfit for human 
consumption. In view of the fact that no fault of a kind 
likely to diminish or eliminate the Community's 
responsibility can apparently be attributed to the recipient, 
the Community is obliged to supply quantities equivalent 
to those which could not be used for human 
consumption... \ 
Thus, according to the legal service, only a fault on the 
part of the recipient, the co-signatory to the agreement, 
could, if the occasion were to arise, weaken the 
Community's responsibility. On the other hand, no 
condition is stipulated concerning possible responsibility on 
the part of an operator, whether contractor or intervention 
agency. The Commission, apparently in application of this 
doctrine, recently decided to replace 240 t of butteroil and 
a consignment of sub-standard durum wheat which had 
been delivered to Morocco via the WFP. This decision was 
taken without waiting for the findings of an enquiry 
intended to pinpoint responsibilities. 
5. POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW TO 
REFORMING THE SYSTEM 
Simplifying and speeding up the procedures 
Overcoming the political complexity of food aid 
5.1. Food aid concerns both development policy and the 
common agricultural policy and, because of its political 
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States and the Council. The Member States, either directly, 
or through the Council, have arranged matters in such a 
way that they are involved in the procedure for managing 
food aid at four stages (as the budgetary authority, then by 
means of the annual regulation laying down the quantities, 
then via the food-aid committee for each allocation and, 
lastly, for each mobilization, via a management 
committee). It should, however, be possible to cut down 
considerably the number ofstages in the procedure and the 
number of parties involved in each stage. 
Taking the simplest existing procedures as a basis 
Triangular operations 
5.2. A triangular operation is one involving food aid that 
is not mobilized in Europe but in a country located, if 
possible, in the same geographical region as the recipient 
country. The sole management body and paying agency is 
the Directorate-General for Development, which awards 
the contracts or selects the bodies responsible for awarding 
them (e.g. NGOs or Commission delegations on the spot). 
The Council retains its monitoring powers through 
the food-aid committee. The Directorate-General for 
Agriculture and the intervention agencies play no part, 
since the products sent as aid are not of EEC origin. 
Aid in the form of oleaginous products 
5.3. The intervention agencies are not involved. The 
Directorate-General for Agriculture awards the contracts 
itself, after publishing invitations to tender in the Official 
Journal of the Communities. The Directorate-General for 
Development pays the successful tenderers. The link with 
the common agricultural policy nevertheless remains in 
cases where it is stipulated, as for the 'traditional products' 
(cereals and milk products), that the goods must be 
procured on the European market, as is the rule, with very 
few exceptions. Again, the Council retains its monitoring 
powers through the food-aid committee. 
Emergency aid (Articles 950 of the budget and 
137 of the Second Lome Convention) 
5.4. This aid is managed exclusively by the 
Directorate-General for Development, which designates the 
operators and pays for the services rendered. The link with 
the common agricultural policy is not broken because of 
the obligation, which is usually still stipulated, to procure 
the product on the European market,, the successful 
tenderers thus receiving the refund by the normal channels 
and making their bids 'less the refund'. This aid is not 
subject to the approval of any committee. This procedure 
has frequently been used in the context of emergency plans 
to combat famine in Africa and has produced good results 
(see the annual report of the Court of Auditors for the 
financial year 1985, paragraph 10.3). 
Suggestions for reform 
5.5. The preceding examples suggest that it must be 
possible to envisage speedier procedures, which, whilst 
ensuring good coordination with the mechanisms of the 
common agricultural policy and respecting the Council's 
powers, will take account of the specific aims of food aid, 
by means of suitable monitoring. 
5.6. Consultation of the Member States could be done on 
one single occasion. This solution, which is far more 
practical than the present string of consultations, would in 
no way alter the inter-institutional balance, and would 
require only that the principle of granting the aid and the 
detailed arrangements for mobilizing it be decided at one 
and the same time. Since 1982, the Commission has been 
tending to move towards the proposed solution, in that it 
has been staggering its aid allocation decisions according to 
the desired delivery periods so that these decisions come 
only a short time before the start of mobilization. 
5.7. At the same time, of course, the annual questioning 
of the recipient countries about their aid requirements 
should not be allowed to take too long. The 1982 reform 
should also make it possible for one single consultation to 
be held for each country in order to discuss the quantities 
to be delivered and to negotiate the delivery arrangements 
(exact nature and characteristics of the product, delivery 
stage, free distribution or sale, people to benefit from the 
aid, exact time of the delivery, use of counterpart funds, 
etc.). 
5.8. As regards coordination with the common 
agricultural policy, the essential point is the product's 
origin, which must as a rule be European. This origin 
could be adequately safeguarded by means of restrictive 
regulations. 
5.9. Food aid must be exempted from the system which is 
a characteristic feature of the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, 
whereby the Member States are granted periodic advances 
which are not settled until long after expenditure has been 
incurred. Specific needs must be satisfied by means of a 
specific management system. The product's supplier and 
the contractor responsible for transporting and delivering it 
to the recipient, who may be separate persons of one and 
the same, ought not to be paid until the services have been 
rendered, as is the rule for public contracts, even though 
this may mean granting suitable advance payments, which 
are settled after delivery. 
5.10. It might even be useful to consider an arrangement 
whereby the contractor, and only the contractor, would be 
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sending in supporting documents to prove the export and 
arrival at destination of the goods, which he himself would 
have purchased on the Community market or from 
intervention agencies. An arrangement of this kind would 
encourage the contractor to make his own checks on the 
quality of the products, as a quality control upon delivery 
would be introduced. 
5.11. A system such as this could be managed directly by 
the Commission or delegated by the latter to agents whose 
obligations would have to be clearly defined. These agents 
could be, but would not need to be, the intervention 
agencies, which would still act as suppliers, moreover, each 
time it was decided to have recourse to intervention 
stocks. 
Ensuring the consistency of management documents 
5.12. The recipient knows only what is stated in the 
supply agreement, and is not supposed to be acquainted 
with the permanent regulations regarding mobilization nor 
with the specific supply regulation. Conversely, the 
intervention agency and the contractor are for their part 
subject to the Community regulations which they are 
supposed to apply, but they have no knowledge of the 
supply agreement made with the recipient. Contradictions 
sometimes arise between these two categories of 
documents, which are drawn up by separate departments. 
5.13. The obvious solution is to move towards a single 
document consisting of a very broad common segment of 
the supply, agreement and the mobilization regulation. The 
mobilization request could simply involve sending this joint 
text. 
5.14. This joint document would be all the easier to 
envisage if the procedures were speeded up. One of the 
chief obstacles at present standing in the way of a proposal 
of this kind is that some of the provisions that are laid 
down in the mobilization regulation have not yet been 
determined at the time when the supply agreement is made. 
But this obstacle would ,be eliminated if these operations 
were closer to each other or were even concomitant. 
Better definition of controls and responsibilities 
Monitoring the execution of the operation is indispensable, 
regardless of whether there is any legal responsibility to 
do so -
5.15. The fact that the Community has no legal 
responsibility for the stages subsequent to the stage up to 
which it finances an operation does not mean that it can 
dissociate itself from what happens after this stage. Just as, 
in the case of a development project, the Community 
makes a point of monitoring its operation well after the 
completion of its own financial involvement or technical 
assistance, it ought likewise to follow up the 
implementation of all food-aid operations as far as the final 
stage of distribution, whatever the point at which its own 
financial involvement ceases. The Community ought not to 
finance aid operations without ascertaining that they 
achieve their objective. 
Need for separate checks at the various stages of carrying 
out the aid operations 
5.16. Depending on the nature of the legal provisions 
governing the relations between the Community, the 
recipient and the various operators involved in the aid 
operation, the respective responsibilities may be differendy 
defined, but the need for checks remains the same, because 
it is connected with the physical risks which the goods run 
during this or that phase (transport, storage, handling) and 
with the risks of fraud associated with the carrying out of 
each service, whoever the person providing the services is. 
Whatever the system for defining the responsibilities, the 
stages are always the same: manufacture of the product, 
shipment, unloading, arrival at destination. In all cases, 
checks have to be made at these different stages. As regards 
the checks carried out at the moment of unloading, which 
are absolutely indispensable, they should relate to all the 
supply's physical features (quantity, quality, packaging). 
The Community should not only stipulate these checks, but 
should also finance them and ensure that they are carried 
out and that they are effective. It should be noted that some 
national aid is checked twice, at shipment and at 
unloading, and also goes through an official taking-delivery 
procedure, involving all the parties, upon arrival at its 
destination, the various parties being notified at the place 
of unloading and at destination by the diplomatic missions 
on the spot. 
Without precise definition of responsibilities, the best 
checks are useless 
5.17. Checks are pointless unless they make it possible to 
bring into play clearly defined responsibilities. For 
example, proof that a delivery is sub-standard or otherwise 
unacceptable does not have any effect if the aggrieved party 
does not have the legal means to press his claim against die 
insurance company, the contractor, the intervention agency 
or even the Community. The examples given earlier in this 
report prove that the present system does not always offer 
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Awarding more contracts with an obligation to achieve a 
result 
5.18. Whenever it seems possible, tenderers to whom 
food aid contracts are awarded should be required to 
accept a firm obligation te achieve a result, without any 
loopholes, such as undue recourse to force majeure, and 
any price increases such as additional expenditure not 
provided for in the contract. To this end, the successful 
tenderer should take out and implement insurance policies 
that enable him to honour this obligation to achieve a 
result. 
5.19. In as many cases as possible, the aim should be to 
deal with one single contractor who would be responsible 
for carrying out the aid operation from the supply of the 
product up to its delivery to the place of destination. 
Dealing with a single contractor does not rule out 
subcontracting — quite the contrary in fact — provided 
that the legal relationship in subcontracting contracts is 
only between the main contractor and his subcontractors. 
This solution would entail a slight increase in the direct 
costs borne by the Community, but would enable it to save 
on intermediate checks and, above all, it would increase the 
likelihood of the operation being carried out well in the 
end, which is in itself a saving. In any case, when a country 
receives aid financed only up to the FOB stage, it runs some 
risks. This therefore supposes that it is in a position to bear 
all the responsibilities from the European port onwards. In 
short, the proposed solution would have two advantages: it 
would require only one contract per aid operation; it would 
keep the successful tenderer in the position of being wholly 
responsible until the moment the services financed under 
his contract were all completed. 
5.20. It is nevertheless clear that some safety-nets have to 
be set up: 
(a) firstly, even in the case of a single contractor, the 
freedom he is allowed in choosing the methods to use 
should not be allowed to impede the proper 
functioning of any system for providing information 
to the Commission which will enable it to intervene 
whenever it feels that Community aid is in grave 
danger of not arriving at its destination undamaged. 
In order to avoid excessive costs, it should also be 
possible to request the contractors, at the time when 
tenders are submitted and then again when the 
supporting documents are submitted with a view to 
payment, to supply a detailed breakdown of the 
various items of the contract (handling costs, 
transport costs, insurance costs, etc.); 
(b) secondly, if the conditions under which the operation 
was to be carried out, in particular the difficulty of 
finding operators and the lack of competition, were to 
make it impossible to use one single contractor, it 
should be permissible to split the operation into as 
many contracts as necessary. The Commission ought 
then to cater efficiently for the monitoring of those 
operations where the need for coordination and direct 
involvement is, in the nature of things, greatest. 
Setting up a taking-delivery procedure involving all parties 
to the agreement as a condition for paying the contractor 
5.21. There is no valid reason why food aid, which is a 
supply like any other, should be exempt from a procedure 
which the Community has laid down for other areas of its 
financial involvement. Thus, for example, the 'General 
clauses for invitations to tender concerning supply 
contracts' provide for a taking-delivery procedure, which is 
generally carried out at the place of destination. The 
Commission can be represented at this procedure, which is 
backed up by financial penalties for cases where the 
services are not carried out properly. Similarly, food aid 
ought systematically to undergo a taking-delivery 
procedure involving all parties to the agreement and 
implemented at the stage as of which the successful 
tenderer no longer bears any responsibility. Payment and 
the release of securities should, of course, be made strictly 
subject to the discharge granted under this procedure. 
Revising the coverage of the insurance policies 
5.22. It would be advisable to make the insurance as far 
as possible independent of the conditions and incidents of 
transport, and instead, preferably, to make it relate only to 
the product itself; to put it at its most extreme, it is the 
goods that should be insured, not the transporting of 
them. 
5.23. The question of who is named as the beneficiary of 
the policy should be reviewed. It is probably better if the 
beneficiary is not the recipient of the aid. It would be 
preferable for the beneficiary to be the contractor, provided 
that his responsibilities had previously been extended, or, 
better still, the Community itself, which is the party with 
the strongest interest in the proper implementation of the 
aid, under the terms of the supply agreement.. Any 
compensation paid by the insurance would then make it 
possible to replace the unacceptable goods despite the lack 
of budgetary appropriations available for financing the 
same aid allocation a second time. 
5.24. Whenever possible, a guarantee based on the 
payment arrangements (e.g. a performance guarantee or 
the lodging of a bank guarantee) should be preferred to the 
guarantee obtained by an insurance policy, since insurance 
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reasons of a kind likely to relieve them of their obligation 
to pay compensation. Securities and guarantees should not 
be released until consent has been given by a Community 
authority, in most cases the Commission Delegate in the 
country receiving the aid. This solution would be 
consistent with the setting-up of the taking-delivery 
procedure suggested in paragraph 5.21. 
6. CONCLUSION 
6.1. The Court's analysis shows that by far the greater 
part of the problems referred to above stem from the 
over-complexity of the regulations and practices relating to 
standards, responsibilities and guarantees in the sphere of 
food aid. In this report, the Court has made various 
recommendations bearing in mind the present scattered 
distribution of responsibilities. The Court nevertheless 
wonders whether an even more effective way of tackling 
this problem might not be to set up, as a matter of priority, 
procedures that were simple and unequivocal. 
6.2. Whether the contracts are entered into with one 
single contractor — which should gradually become the 
rule, especially if experience shows that an adequate 
number of economic operators are coming to the fore who 
are capable of carrying through such operations —, or 
whether the contracts are split up — which could be an 
option whenever a food-aid operation requires extra 
supervision —, the procedures should have as their 
common denominator the introduction of obligations to 
achieve a result that are covered by performance guarantees 
released on the basis of final checks made at the place of 
destination (or at the place of transition to the subsequent 
phase, in the case of a split contract) with the participation 
of a Community representative. 
6.3. Whatever solution is chosen, there will be a price to 
pay: 
(a) more frequent recourse to delivered, place of 
destination arrangements, on the one hand, and to 
contracts with a sole contractor, on the other hand, 
will in many cases be more expensive than the options 
most frequently used at present of FOB or CIF 
deliveries. But experience has shown that the 
Commission's attempt to align the stages of supplying 
food aid with the commercial notions of FOB, and 
above all of CIF, has resulted in failure. These 
practices are effective in the context of purely 
commercial transactions where the seller and the 
purchaser are as a rule dealing on the same footing, 
and where the latter has the means of imposing 
economic sanctions on the former for any failings. 
The same practices cannot be applied in the case of a 
gift, as the recipient of the aid does not then have at 
his disposal the same means of imposing penalties; 
(b) as regards the exceptional implementation of split 
operations under the close supervision of Community 
staff, this is pointless unless the latter are suitably 
equipped to ensure effective management and 
monitoring. Here too, the solution chosen will mean 
that the budgetary resources at present available will 
have to be reallocated. 
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 27 May 
1987. 
For the Court of Auditors 
Marcel MART 
President 
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1. Some of the inadequacies noted relate to the quantity 
delivered, others to the type and quality of the product, others to 
the packaging of the product and others, finally, to the time and 
place of delivery. The cases of sub-standard delivery set out in this 
annex sometimes date back a long time. Nevertheless, they are all 
still significant, either because the original regulations have not 
been amended or because the new regulations have not 
substantially improved the system of aid management and 
control. 
A. Inadequacies relating to the amount delivered (or the value 
transferred) 
1. Quantities missing from specific consignments 
2. Of a 50 t consignment of butteroil, for delivery to Burundi 
during the course of 1982, 121 were missing on arrival at 
Bujumbura. 
3. Quite considerable losses were recorded in 1982 in relation to 
a triangular operation involving the purchase of millet in Senegal 
for dispatch to Chad and the Niger. According to the annual 
report of the Commission's Delegate in Senegal, the cause of these 
losses was 'the poor quality of the sacks and the fact that they were 
not properly fastened'. 
4. Under the terms of the 1983 programme, Ghana was supposed 
to receive 7 935 t of long-grained rice, plus a further 2 760 t of the 
same product by way of emergency aid, all packaged in 50 kg 
sacks. It was noted on arrival that, from the two shipments, 3 540 
sacks were missing and 3 345 sacks were either empty or did not 
contain the total stipulated weight. In total, about 300 t were 
missing, i.e. 2,8 % of the total agreed quantity, involving an 
estimated loss of 0,2 Mio ECU. 
5. Following a storm at sea, the maritime transport undertaking 
which had loaded 5 965 t of colza oil on 19 May 1982 for 
shipping to Bangladesh was obliged to sell off 1 939 t in Singapore 
and deliver only what was left to Bangladesh. The company which 
had received the food aid contract did, however, subsequendy 
agree to deliver the missing quantity. 
2. Quantities regularly missing 
6. Losses are regularly recorded in the case of aid granted to the 
Comoro Islands. Average losses for cereals amount to 10 % of the 
delivery, but in some extreme cases they have amounted to as 
much as 25 %. These losses are caused by transport on poor 
quality vessels or by transhipments due to the lack of regular 
services and to the fact that the Comoro Island ports are 
inaccessible to deep-sea vessels. 
7. Losses of more than 10 % are recorded each year for milk 
powder received by Burundi, apparendy because the packaging is 
not strong enough to resist the stresses caused by the numerous 
transhipments that occur during transport. 
8. From the 1977 to 1982 programmes, 496 t of milk powder out 
of total allocations to Ghana of 11 100 t, i.e. 4,5 %, were lost, 
and, out of a total allocation of 1 860 t of butteroil, 411, i.e. 
2,2 % were also lost. Each of the years in question was affected by 
losses. The losses were noted whilst the goods were being 
unloaded, though the official delivery had already taken place at 
the port of loading (FOB). 
9. In Ghana, the storage of milk powder without the use of 
pallets or tarpaulins encourages deterioration and theft. 
10. In Tanzania, the following losses were recorded during the 
unloading of the goods: 783 t of wheat, 95,8 t of skimmed-milk 
powder and 11,1 t of butteroil in 1980; 126,6 t of skimmed-milk 
powder in 1981. At European prices, these losses exceeded 
0,4 Mio ECU in value. 
3. Missing quantities which were not replaced, or were replaced 
late 
11. In most cases, the missing quantities were not replaced. The 
Court has made special note of the failure to replace certain 
consignments. 
12. In 1981, 15 000 t of wheat were granted to Pakistan via the 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) for 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. During unloading in Karachi, 33,4 t 
were found to be missing from the two vessels which had 
transported the wheat. An amount of 10,1 t was subsequently 
'found', bringing the final loss to 23,3 t, i.e. an insured value of 
some 41 400 FF (about 6 900 ECU). Admittedly, the loss rate was 
very low (1,6 %), but as the wheat was in sacks, the loss was 
clearly identifiable and unacceptable. Furthermore, other sacks, 
representing a considerably greater tonnage, were found to be 
damaged. Amongst the possible causes of loss it should be noted 
that, of the 15 000 t in question, 7 500 had been loaded on a 
vessel which was eight years older than the maximum 15 years laid 
down by the regulation on the mobilization of cereals. The 
recipient was not indemnified because the insurance did not cover 
the risk of loss, despite the requirement in the regulation which 
stipulates that the recipient must take out an insurance policy 
'covering all transport risks'. 
13. Out of the 1 500 t of milk powder to be delivered to Zambia 
at the beginning of 1982, 230 t, i.e. 15 %, were missing on arrival 
at Lusaka and 35 t were damaged. The missing quantities, which 
were probably lost during overland transport in Africa, were not 
replaced. The loss and damage could have been avoided if the 
goods had been placed in containers. 
14. Two consignments of long-grained milled rice delivered to 
Ghana under the 1983 programme were found to be short of a 
total of 3001. The loss was partly caused by damage to the sacks. 
At the time of the Court's on-the-spot visit of inspection in January 
1985, no claim had yet been submitted by the Ghanaian 
authorities to the insurers, more than seven months after the 
arrival of the first consignment and more than three months after 
the arrival of the second. The Commission Delegation in Ghana 
had not taken any action either to see that the damage suffered by 
the recipient was made good. 
15. Under the 1982 programme, 15 000 t of maize were granted 
to Mozambique. When the maize arrived at its destination, the 
recipient noted that some of it was missing. It is true that the 
estimates of the missing amounts are vague, varying from 280 to 
1 807 t according to the source. However, it has not been possible 
to identify the cause of the losses, despite an on-the-spot inquiry by 
the Commission's legal department. Although the loss suffered by 
Mozambique by way of missing amounts and very poor quality 
maize (see paragraph 25 below) has been estimated by the 
Commission to total 5 000 t, the latter has not taken steps to 
replace the 5 000 t in question. The reasons for this are threefold: 17. 8. 87  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 219/27 
no appropriations are available for this purpose, replacement is 
dependent on the identification of the parties responsible and, 
finally, the inquiries launched by the Commission to establish 
responsibility have ground to a halt, even though some of the 
parties responsible have been identified (a mistake, which was not 
denied, on the part of the intervention agency). Furthermore, 
when a claim was submitted to the insurance company, it denied 
that it was under any obligation to pay an indemnity. 
4. Financing costs wrongly borne by the recipient 
16. Food aid consists in the financing of a product, but also in 
transporting it to an agreed point. If, therefore, the recipient has to 
bear certain transport or handling costs in order to ensure the 
goods reach the agreed stage, then the supply has not been made in 
accordance with the agreed terms. Thus, the chartering conditions 
of the two vessels which transported the 15 000 t of wheat to 
Pakistan via the UNHCR in November 1981 (see paragraph 12 
above) did not include the unloading costs, so that the recipient 
was forced to bear them itself. This contravenes the Community 
Regulation on deliveries financed to the port of unloading, which 
lays down that the contractor who has been awarded the supply 
contract shall be responsible for all costs incurred by the goods up 
to and including wharfage costs (Article 13 (5) of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1974/80) (»). 
17. Thus, since the policy of the port of Beirut is not to include 
the unloading costs in the freight rate, the contractor responsible 
for supplying the emergency delivery, to CIF stage, of 250 t of 
soya oil to the Lebanon via the UNRWA (
2) (1983), citing the port 
of Beirut's policy in this matter in his own defence, refused to bear 
the unloading costs. The Commission therefore decided to 
reimburse them to the UNRWA (Internal note No 26.471 of 
23. 11. 1983). The cause of this incident may be traced back to 
the mobilization request, which defined the delivery stage by 
reference to the ambiguous concept of CIF. 
18. The loss suffered by Mozambique at the time of the delivery 
referred to in paragraphs 15 above and 25 below, was estimated 
by the Commission at 5 000 t because it considered that 10 000 t 
could be recovered by sifting. In so doing, the Commission 
underestimated the financial cost of a sifting operation involving 
several thousand tonnes. ' . 
B. Inadequacies relating to the type and quality of the product 
19. Inadequacies relating to the type and quality of the product 
may be divided into three categories: 
a) the first category includes deliveries in which the quality and 
state of preservation of the product are not necessarily open to 
criticism, but in which the products themselves are of a 
different type from what was ordered or desirable: in such 
cases, the Community has not delivered the product required; 
b) in the second category, the quality chosen at the outset is 
inadequate; 
0) The footnotes are set out together at the end of Annex 1. 
c) the third category includes cases of products which have 
deteriorated to a level below the permitted standard. 
Although the first category covers easily identifiable cases, the 
second two categories are hard to differentiate: on the one hand, 
many cases are a combination of the two categories since the initial 
quality of the product is inadequate and the product then goes on 
to deteriorate further and then, on the other hand, it is not always 
possible to tell whether a given defect is caused by the choice of 
second or third-rate products or by a gradual deterioration 
throughout the various stages of the supply procedure. For this 
reason, in the following pages classification of some deliveries into 
either one of the last two categories will only be given as a general 
guide. Despite this uncertainty, it is clear that cases where the 
initial quality is called into question occur much more frequently 
than cases of deterioration as a result of damage to the product. 
1. Product of a different type from what was specified or 
desirable 
20. In October 1982, Botswana received a delivery of 500 t of 
non-vitaminized skimmed milk powder, which was contrary to the 
most basic dictates of common sense. Since the milk was intended 
for direct consumption by children in schools and small clinics, it 
should have been vitaminized to prevent the risk of serious gastric 
disorders. This mistake resulted from the absence of instructions in 
this respect in the texts relating to the mobilization of this aid. 
21. A consignment of 500 t of skimmed-milk powder delivered to 
Mauritius in 1982 also lacked vitamins. In this case, too, the 
addition of vitamins was essential, since the powder was for 
immediate distribution to more than 100 000 people from 
vulnerable categories (children, pregnant women, invalids etc.). 
The supply agreement reached with the government definitely 
stipulated that the vitamins should be added, but the 
Directorate-General for Development at the Commission omitted 
to mention this requirement in the mobilization request which it 
sent to the Commission's Directorate-General for Agriculture. 
22. Butteroil makes up an important part of the aid delivered to 
Sri Lanka, even though butter is not part of the local diet. Supplies 
of whole-milk powder, which an NGO recipient agency has in fact 
requested, would be far preferable. Similarly, Mali would prefer to 
receive milk powder with a fat content of 26 %, which would be 
very similar to the type of milk consumed locally. The reason given 
by the Commission for only delivering skimmed milk is that 
full-fat milk powder does not keep well. But is this problem not 
connected with the type of packaging normally used for the 
shipment of Community milk powder? Furthermore, the 
Commission has recently decided to deliver full-fat milk powder to 
Tunisia (Decision of 22 November 1985 concerning 3 000 t). 
23. Until recently, (i.e. at least until 1984) the skimmed-milk 
powder delivered to Ghana, despite repeated protests, rarely had 
the qualities necessary for milk production by the evaporation 
method, which is the process used in that country. The powder 
delivered had a low level of heat stability, whereas the 
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fact, the mobilization regulations for example Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1572/85 of 10 June 1985 (
3) (1 200 t), or 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1176/84 of 27 April 1984 («) 
(2 200 t), did not specify the quality required. 
2. Inadequate quality definitely or probably connected with the 
choice of product 
24. The most obvious cases are those of products containing 
excessive amounts of impurities, dust and broken grains. In Cape 
Verde, EEC maize is considered to contain excessive amounts of 
broken grains and dust and to be clearly inferior to American 
maize. 
25. The 15 000 t of maize which were loaded in the port of Le 
Havre in 1983, bound for Mozambique, were found to be old, full 
of broken grains, foreign grains, impurities and mould and were 
totaly unfit for human consumption, according to the report made 
during unloading. No definite conclusion has been drawn 
regarding responsibility, but it is highly probable that the product's 
main defects already existed at the time of loading. Furthermore, 
the results of the analyses carried out before loading, which were, 
of course, much less thorough than the report made during 
unloading, showed in any case that the goods were not up to the 
regulation standard. The intervention agency was therefore at fault 
in issuing a certificate of conformity, and there was also negligence 
on the part of the supplier. 
26. An identical case to the previous one, concerning 8 000 t of 
the same product, occurred more recently in connection with the 
1985 programme for Burkina Faso. As well as the product, the 
intervention body, the contractor and the port of shipment were 
also all identical to those in the previous case. The same certificate 
of conformity was issued at loading and subsequent analyses gave 
the same results, namely that the maize was of unacceptable 
quality and was probably maize fodder. 
27. Other supplies of maize from France have also caused 
problems. Complaints have been made by Tanzania concerning 
4 0001, by Zambia concerning 500 t, by Ethiopia concerning 
5 000 t, by Kenya concerning 1501, by Uganda concerning 150 t 
and by the Niger concerning 26 000 t (
5). It is out of the question 
that there could be collusion on the part of the recipients in order 
to deceive the Commission. Furthermore, as regards the maize 
delivered to the Niger, the Commission's delegation brought back 
a sample to Brussels: it was not even acceptable as animal fodder. 
Of the eight cases of disputed maize mentioned under para-
graphs 26 to 28, all were mobilized in France by the Office 
national interprofessionel des cereales (a French cereals agency) 
and six of them were assigned to- the same contractor and were 
loaded in the port of Le Havre. Though such coincidences dot not 
prove anything, they do at least tend to justify the precautions 
taken by the Commission, which has decided not to allocate any 
further consignments of this product. 
28. It has sometimes happened that the product delivered was too 
old, which meant that the wrong choice had definitely been made 
in Europe. In 1982, India received 5 0001 of skimmed-milk 
powder which was older than had been stipulated in the supply 
agreement (seven to eight months old instead of six months). This 
situation arose following a series of problems and mistakes. 
Initially, because the Council was too late drawing up the 1982 
programme, the Community was forced to grant emergency aid in 
order to prevent an exhaustion of stocks in India, which relies on 
considerable EEC allocations each year as part of the FLOOD 
operation. Because of the urgency, the Directorate-General for 
Agriculture (DG VI) preferred to use intervention stocks for the 
mobilization rather than the Community market. At that time, 
however, stocks of fresh milk powder in intervention were very 
low. 
29. In Mali, both the OPAM («), the agency that receives cereals, 
and the ULB, the dairy industry body which receives milk 
products, complain that they are frequently sent products which 
are too old, and which, in the case of milk products, come from 
out-of-date intervention stocks. Eleven tonnes of milk powder 
from the 1982 programme had to be destroyed because it had gone 
bad. This would seem to put the blame on the suppliers, the 
interventions bodies and the inspection companies, though it is not 
possible to work out the financial responsibility of each body. 
30. Organoleptic (
7) deficiencies in the products are usually the 
result of either excessive age or abnormal physical and chemical 
composition. In 1980, Bangladesh received 1001 of skimmed milk 
powder which had a disagreeable, musty taste and an unusual 
appearance. 
31. The Ghanaian company which receives milk products 
complained during the Court's audit visit in January 1985 that it 
had received two deliveries of butteroil which were slightly rancid 
and resembled cheese. 
32. The 240 t of butteroil delivered to Morocco in August 1983 
via the WFP were unfit for human consumption, notably because 
they contained three to four times the maximum level of aerobic 
germs permitted by the French regulations. The product had come 
from French intervention stocks and the Moroccan authorities 
were contemplating using the consignment to manufacture soap. 
At the request of the WFP, the Commission agreed to replace the 
consignment and steps have been taken by the Commission with a 
view to instituting proceedings against the contractor. In this case 
the quality controls are suspect, unless the deterioration of the 
product occurred during manufacture: the French veterinary 
laboratory which analysed the butter did not make any criticism, 
whereas subsequent tests carried out in London, Casablanca, Paris 
and Belgium as well as an expert evaluation by the FAO, all 
concluded that the butteroil should be rejected. 
33. In the same year, Tunisia received 345 t of butteroil of 
comparable quality. The tests carried out, at the recipient's 
request, by the Laboratoire Central dHygiene Alimentaire in 
France on samples taken before loading showed that the butteroil 
had been manufactured from old stocks of intervention butter, 
contained a high level of peroxide and was contaminated with 
faeces. In this case too, certain quality controls should be 
questioned: other analyses carried out .on the same consignment of 
butteroil by the Societe Generate de Surveillance, whilst confirming 
the abnormally high peroxide content, concluded that there was 
no contamination from faeces. In contrast, the inspections carried 
out by the intervention body before the product was loaded had 
concluded that the consignment was up to standard. , 
34. Also in the same year, Tunisia received 1 000 t of powdered 
milk which had numerous defects: a humidity content in excess of 
the permitted maximum, aerobic germs, a musty taste, an 
abnormal colour and impurities. This consignment had also been 
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recipient's request, both before loading and after unloading, all 
concluded that the consignment was sub-standard. However, due 
to the lateness of the recipient's claim, it was difficult to distinguish 
between damage which had already occurred at the time of 
unloading and deterioration caused subsequently by the handling 
and storage conditions in the country itself after unloading. No 
quality control had been carried out at the initiative of the 
intervention body before loading, which however, is fully in line 
with the current regulations, which only provide for such controls 
in the case of milk products which are taken from intervention 
stocks and delivered without further processing. 
35. On the other hand, this consignment of milk powder was 
covered successively by five certificates of export quality, issued on 
23 September 1983 by the veterinary departments of the Ministry, 
of Agriculture in France, that is, 52 days before loading actually 
took place, and was provided with a quality certificate signed by 
the contractors themselves. 
These certificates were then withdrawn, for some unknown 
reason, and replaced by others issued in October 1983. All of these 
certificates, which were issued under the regulations of the 
Member State concerned, concluded that the consignment was of 
regulation quality. 
36. Each year, the Bangladeshi government reports on the poor 
quality of wheat received from the EEC, which is unsuitable for 
long-term storage. During an inspection visit to this country, the 
Court noted, in particular, the poor quality of 20 000 t of wheat 
delivered as indirect aid in 1978, and the totally unacceptable 
quality of 5 000 t of wheat delivered in 1979. 
37. The Djibouti authorities declared that 2 920 t of wheat flour 
were not of bread-making quality (the Court's findings on 
deliveries in 1982 and 1983). 
38. If an excessively high humidity level is recorded once a 
consignment arrives at its destination, there may be some doubts 
regarding the source of the problem, i.e. whether it already existed 
before loading in Europe or occurred during shipment. This was 
the case for wheat received in December 1982 by Sri Lanka, the 
humidity level of which exceeded the rate of 14,5 % authorized by 
the mobilization regulation. Moreover, according to local experts, 
14,5 % humidity is too high for prolonged storage in a tropical 
climate and makes the wheat unsuitable for milling. At any rate, 
EEC food aid was definitely implicated: local millers had in fact 
noticed that European wheat received by way of commercial 
imports had a lower humidity rate (12 to 13 %). 
39. However, there is no possible doubt about the source of the 
problem if the inadequacy has actually been noted in Europe. 
5 000 t of common wheat were shipped to Benin under the 1980 
programme, even though the certificates drawn up by the Soriete 
Generale de Surveillance clearly stated that they did not comply 
with the regulations, due to their excessive humidity and 
unacceptable level of impurities. Here is yet another example to 
show that the current system of quality controls cannot adequately 
ensure that defective supplies are intercepted in time. 
40. Court officials on an audit visit to Bangladesh in 1981 
noted the unacceptable quality of 125 t of butter. Although the 
exact nature of the defect was not specified, it was established that 
it had arisen in Europe. The contractor, who had tried to improve 
the product by mixing it with others, was forced to replace the 
whole consignment at his own expense. 
41. In its Annual Report concerning the financial year 1979, the 
Court noted (paragraph 9.13, first indent) that various emergency 
deliveries of rice, totalling more than 5 000 t, were unfit for 
human consumption. 
42. Each year, from 1979 to 1982, Indonesia received 
skimmed-milk powder of unacceptable quality; 631 t in 1979,44 t 
in 1980, 230 t in 1981 and 214 t in 1982, i.e. 17 % of the total 
quantities of skimmed-milk powder received in direct aid during 
that period (1 119 t out of 6 475 t). For 1980, the reasons have 
partly been identified. It seems that the defects were partly due to 
the poor quality of the supplies and partly due to incidents during 
shipment. When reconstituted, the milk obtained from the powder 
had a strong taste of groundnut oil. However, the dairy which 
received the product had also noted that some of the bags were 
torn. Whatever the reason, the Indonesians had to sell the 44 t of 
powder as cattle fodder since it was unfit for human 
consumption. 
3. Inadequate quality attributable to the deterioration of the 
product during shipment 
43. In the case of the 1 000 t of skimmed milk powder for 
Tunisia mentioned previously (paragraph 34 above), a large 
proportion of the bags were torn, sometimes even through to the 
inside polyethylene layer. In the latter case, the product was spoilt 
by excessive humidity. The damage suffered by the bags raises 
unavoidable questions regarding the transport, handling and 
storage conditions, but also emphasizes the flimsiness of the 
packaging used for milk products, which has been severely 
criticized by the Court on many occasions (see paragraphs 54 to 65 
below). 
44. Specifically in relation to damage caused by maritime 
transport, mention should be made of the case of 1 500 t of wheat 
received by Zambia in October 1976. This consignment was spoilt 
by the presence in the ship's hold of ammonium nitrate, left over 
from a previous cargo. The consignment was not replaced by the 
Community until two and a half years later. 
45. In Senegal, out of three deliveries of skimmed-milk powder 
made via an NGO shortly before the Court's audit visit of 
inspection in June and July 1981, amounts were lost (5 880 kg) 
and damaged during shipment (6 720 kg) in all three cases. 
46. The conditions under which it was conveyed by sea are also 
to blame for the deterioration of a consignment of 9741 of wheat 
flour, delivered CIF to Djibouti and declared unfit for human 
consumption on 10 November 1982 by the local hygiene 
department, even though a few days previously two Belgian 
laboratories had declared that it complied with the requirements. 
Having been refused by the recipient, the flour was sold by the 
transport undertaking to Zaire in 1984! This cargo had been 
loaded in March 1982, trans-shipped onto a second vessel in 
August 1982, immobilized on several occasions in Mediterranean 
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26 October 1982. In view of the fact that it had been in a ship's 
hold for more than seven months, it is hardly surprising that the 
product was spoilt. These incidents were caused by the insolvency 
of the shipowner, against whom the Belgian intervention agency 
has instituted legal proceedings. 
47. In the Comoro islands, the absence of regular sea links and 
the inconvenience of the ports of Moroni and Mustamudu make 
serious shipowners reluctant to transport aid to these ports. 
Consequently the contractors resort to the services of 'cowboy' 
shipping companies, whose vessels usually sail under a flag of 
convenience or the flag of an East European country. The quality 
of the delivery suffers as a consequence. One vessel was 
shipwrecked in 1977 and another suffered a serious accident af 
sea. 
48. It was rather the conditions of overland transport on the 
African continent that were to blame in the case of a delivery of 
100 t of milk powder to Burundi under the 1983 programme. 
Some of the packages, which again were too fragile, were not able 
to withstand the numerous trans-shipment operations during 
transport. 
49. In other cages, the length of the period of storage is 
responsible for the loss in quality. In Morocco, 1 5001 of 
vitaminized milk powder and 200 t of butteroil were still at the 
port of Casablanca in April 1983, having been there since 21 
September 1982. Since the vitamins cannot be preserved for longer 
than six months, they were in effect wasted. 
50. In Cape Verde, a similar wastage of vitamins occurred in the 
case of milk powder dating from June 1984 which was still in 
storage in warehouses in Praia in March 1985. 
C. Inadequacies relating t6 the packaging of the product 
51. At first sight, inadequate packaging would seem to be a cause 
of defective deliveries, rather than a separate defect affecting the 
quality of the products delivered. However, in actual fact, this is a 
borderline area and inadequate packaging should be criticized as a 
defect in itself. Firstly, in modern design, the packaging is an 
integral part of the product. A good product, delivered in 
packaging with a capacity unsuitable for the requirements of its 
users, is in fact a bad product. Even if the product itself has not 
been spoilt, if it reaches its addressee in a burst package, it is a bad 
product. Flimsy packaging should be criticised even if by some 
good fortune it remains intact after transport. Finally, the 
packages provide an opportunity to send information to the user, 
and the relevance of such markings needs to be examined. 
1. Capacity of packaging unsuited to requirements 
52. * Until 1982, the butteroil delivered to Zambia was packaged 
in 5 kg canisters, whereas the dairy receiving the product had 
always asked for 90 kg drums. Despite a request by Zambia to this 
effect concerning the 1983 delivery, the Commission gave 
instructions to deliver the product in canisters of only 20 kg. 
2. Fragile and/or damaged packaging 
53. In Pakistan, more than 20 % of the butteroil canisters do not 
withstand the various handling processes they have to go through 
(transfer from ship to train, from train to lorry and from lorry to 
ox cart). 
54. In Burundi, the Court's audit visit in June 1984 found that 
approximately 5 % of the butteroil canisters in storage which it 
had been able to examine were damaged and leaking. 
55. Court officials on an audit visit in Morocco in 1983 also 
noted butteroil canisters which were badly damaged. 
56. Virtually every time the Court has been asked to examine 
stocks of butteroil, it has recorded similar damage (badly dented 
canisters, cracked canisters etc.). This is because the type of metal 
canister most commonly used is too fragile. It is a cylinder with a 
5 kg capacity which is much too tall and therefore not sufficiently 
resistant to knocks. A cylinder which is more compact and almost 
disc-shaped, would be much more suitable. This is a loophole in 
the mobilization regulations. 
57- Out of 5 965 t of colza oil shipped to Bangladesh on 19 May 
1982, many drums were found to be badly damaged on arrival. It 
is true that the reason for this was very different from the previous 
cases — the vessel had been through a storm (see also the 
quantities missing from this delivery, mentioned in paragraph 5 
above). 
58. On many occasions, Court officials on audit visits have also 
noted that the bags used for packaging milk powder are extremely 
flimsy, easily damaged and are not watertight. In this respect, 
mention should be made of the case of 1 0001 of milk powder 
received by Tunisia in November 1983, already referred to in 
paragraph 43 above. In this case, the extreme flimsiness of the 
bags was corroborated by the findings of the Delegation's adviser, 
who remarked at the same time that commercially imported stocks 
of milk, which were packaged with an extra outer bag, were in 
perfect condition. 
59. The Indonesian dairy industry body which receives 
Community milk powder found torn bags amongst the deliveries 
for 1980 (already mentioned in paragraph 42 above). 
60. The Mali authorities periodically record similar findings for 
some consignments of milk powder. 
61. A report on the delivery of 2 000 bags of vitaminized milk 
powder unloaded at Benin in December 1980 noted 192 bags 
which were either wet, torn or soiled. In this case, the result was 
probably due to a combination of the flimsiness of the bags and 
incidents during transport. 
62. In the case of a consignment of 1 500 t of vitaminized milk 
powder received by Morocco in September 1982, many of the 
paper bags were torn. 
63. Apart from the case mentioned in paragraph 64 below, 
generally speaking, the Court has not found that deterioration is 
the fault of the contractor. In actual fact, it is the requirements of 
the regulations as regards packaging which do not offer sufficient 
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64. During an audit visit by the Court in Ghana, a case was noted 
where the lack of watertightness was due to faulty fastening: all 
the layers making up the bag, including the polyethylene inner 
layer, had been welded at the same time, thus allowing moisture to 
enter. It is essential that the polyethylene layer should be welded 
separately first, before the other paper layers are closed. 
65. The fastening process is also implicated in the following case. 
The 1 kg bags of milk powder sent to China by way of emergency 
aid in November 1981 (500 t) had not been sealed in accordance 
with the requirements of the mobilization regulation (
8). Instead of 
being sealed by two parallel welds of 1,5 mm each, the fastening 
comprised a single weld 4 mm wide. This was unquestionably the 
fault of the contractor. However, in the end the bags arrived in 
good condition. 
3. Defects in bulk packaging and handling methods 
66. The damage suffered by the packaging is sometimes 
attributable to the outer containers (cartons, crates) and to the 
handling methods. Usually, canisters of butteroil are placed in 
cartons which, as they are often badly fastened, are open and 
damaged on arrival and as a result the metal canisters are directly 
exposed to knocks. 
67. The canisters of butteroil observed during an audit visit by 
the Court to Morocco (see paragraph 55 above), were damaged 
because the fastening device on the cartons was inadequate. 
68. In Sri Lanka, the Court's audit visit in October 1983 found 
that rusty canisters of butteroil were placed in cartons which were 
torn and partly open, due to the absence of metal hoops. 
69. In Burundi, an audit visit by the Court in June 1984 found 
that cartons containing 38 t of butteroil delivered under the 1982 
programme had had to be replaced by wooden crates, at the 
expense of the recipient country. 
70. In Mali, up to 1982, canisters of butteroil were not delivered 
in containers, with the result that the 1982 consignment included 
many canisters which were misshapen and punctured. Since then, 
these defects have disappeared because the canisters are now 
delivered in containers. 
71. It should also be noted that, in the case of the 100 t of milk 
powder delivered to Burundi under the 1983 programme, already 
mentioned in paragraph 48 above, part of the consignment, which 
had been transported in containers, arrived in good condition. It 
was only the remainder of the consignment, which had not been 
transported in containers, and not stored on pallets in Burundi, 
which was badly damaged. 
72. The reason why it was found, during the Court's audit visit in 
April 1983, that many of the bags of milk powder delivered to 
Morocco in 1982 and mentioned in paragraph 62 above were 
damaged was that they had been handled individually and not on 
their pallets. 
73. Although in the short term the Commission has almost no 
means of improving storage and handling conditions after 
unloading, since these procedures are too dependent on local 
factors, it is, on the other hand, unfortunate that the mobilization 
regulations, especially those relating to milk products, are not 
more strict in the matter of bulk packaging. 
4. Defects relating to the markings on the packages 
74. An adviser in the Commission's Delegation to Tunisia noted 
that most of the bags of milk powder delivered in November 1983 
were incorrectly marked in French *Skimmed-milk powder. Gift of 
the EEC and that some bags bore no markings at all. The 
mobilization regulation required the more detailed marking: 'Gift 
from the European Economic Community to the Republic of 
Tunisia'. The contractor had thus not fulfilled his contract 
obligations. 
75. The markings on packaging for milk products are not such as 
to ensure that these products are used correctly and safely from a 
health and dietary point of view. Packages of butteroil and milk 
powder do not indicate how the products should be used. 
Although the Court made this remark in relation to milk powder 
as far back as 1980, in its Annual Report concerning the financial 
year 1979 (paragraph 9.13), the situation has still not changed. 
76. Bags of vitaminized milk powder usually do not give an 
uncoded indication of the date of manufacture, or the expiry date; 
such omissions are all the more serious as after six months' 
shelf-life vitamins start to break down and eventually disappear 
and non-vitaminized milk can cause serious gastric disorders. 
77. Although similar deficiencies have been noted on many 
occasions, here are some typical examples: 
(a) In Sri Lanka, butteroil was delivered without any indications 
as to how it was to be used. Yet, in that country, such 
instructions are particularly necessary, since the various 
ethnic groups are not familiar with the product (findings of an 
on-the-spot visit of inspection by the Court); 
(b) In Benin, neither the date of manufacture nor the expiry date 
were indicated for vitaminized milk powder. In that country, 
the head of one NGO even wanted the words 'Not to be used 
for babies less than three months old' to be marked on the 
bags because milk powder causes serious intestinal disorders 
in such cases (findings of an on-the-spot visit of inspection by 
the Court); 
(c) 2 000 t of vitaminized milk powder delivered to China in 
November 1981 did not indicate the expiry date. Bearing in 
mind the time taken for the milk to reach Chinese ports and 
the time taken to distribute it inside the country, an expiry 
date would have been extremely useful. 
78. The cause of this failure to indicate the correct method for 
using the products is the lack of provisions in this respect in the 
mobilization regulations. Yet other donors indicate die date of 
manufacture, the expiry date and even the directions for use on the 
packaging of milk products in uncoded form and in several 
languages, as was noted during an audit visit by the Court to Sri 
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79. Also with reference to the use of the product, although not in 
relation to the markings on the packaging, but to the official letter 
validating the supply agreement, mention should also be made, by 
analogy, of the case of a delivery of vitaminized milk powder to 
Morocco. The Commission included the following instructions in 
the special conditions which were sent to Morocco on 17 July 
1982: 'Milk powder can be distributed either mixed with other 
foods or in the form of liquid milk, cheese, yoghurts, etc. . . .'. 
Not only was no warning given regarding the expiry date, 
therefore, but, instead, inappropriate instructions were given to 
the users, since the process of manufacture of certain cheeses 
destroys the vitamins contained in milk powder. 
80. The markings on the packaging which indicate that the 
product is a gift of the Community are sometimes not sufficiently 
obvious, and, indeed, are sometimes inappropriate. On 25 March 
1983, the Commission Delegation in Morocco noted, apropos of 
milk powder delivered to that country: 'The packaging gives more 
publicity to the contractor than to the fact that the product is a gift 
from the Community . . .'. 
81. Conversely, in the case of aid which is intended for retail sale, 
the marking 'Gift of the EEC, although correct, might well come 
as a surprise to the final beneficiaries, who are asked to pay for the 
product. In Zaire, the sale on the market of bags marked in this 
way led to a stormy campaign in the press (the Court's audit visit 
of inspection in November 1980). 
82. A similar finding was made more recently (in March 1985) 
during the Court's audit visit to Cape Verde. In this case, butteroil 
was being sold retail in 5 kg canister samples. In these two cases, 
the contractor had correctly applied the provisions of the 
mobilization regulation. 
D. Inadequacies relating to the time and place of delivery of 
distribution 
1. Delivery or distribution after the date requested by the 
recipient 
83. Bangladesh prefers aid in the form of cereals to be delivered 
as soon as possible after the adoption of the annual Council 
Regulation concerning the food aid programme. In actual fact, 
however, the aid reaches the country between July and September. 
The reasons for this are not known, and should be analysed case 
by case. However, it should be mentioned that in the past the 
Council has often been late drawing up the annual programme, 
even, in some cases, as late as July (in the case of the 1983 
programme). 
84. A delivery of butteroil allocated to this same country under 
the 1979 programme was considerably delayed for a whole series 
of reasons. Firstly, the first invitation to tender had to be cancelled 
and repeated because the bids were too high. Secondly, the 
delivery of 5001 was further delayed following a fire in a factory 
in Europe. Finally, in the case of 1 5001, further delays occurred 
because the vessels were late arriving at the port of shipment. 
85. A consignment of 109 t of common wheat allocated to Mali 
via the WFP under the 1982 programme, was not loaded until 
November 1983, following two unsuccessful invitations to 
tender. 
86. The late arrival of 50 t of butteroil delivered to Burundi in 
1980 was due to the goods being held up in the port of Dar es 
Salaam for about six months. 
87. This is also an appropriate moment to refer back to the case 
mentioned in paragraph 46 above, in which aid granted to 
Djibouti and loaded in Europe in March 1982 did not arrive at 
Djibouti until the end of October, following various incidents at 
sea. 
88. In the following case, it was the distribution and not the 
delivery which was delayed. A consignment of 2 000 t of milk 
powder arrived in Senegal at the end of September 1981. The 
distribution was not completed until the end of August 1982, 
because of a dispute between the contractor and the shipowner and 
because the product was held up in the warehouses of a 
forwarding agent. 
89. A comparable case occurred some time later in the same 
country. A consignment of 10 000 t of wheat, which was unloaded 
in mid-January 1983, was still in a warehouse at the end of April 
1983, pending the distribution of 12 500 t of Canadian wheat 
which had reached Senegal two weeks before the EEC 
consignment. In this case, the reason was bad coordination of the 
aid. 
90. The following case is entirely different, since it concerns an 
allocation in cash, rather than in kind, which was made to the 
UNHCR for the purchase of rice for refugees in Thailand. The 
payment of an advance of 2,3 Mio ECU was made in March 1983 
instead of July 1982. Taking into account the fall in the exchange 
rate, this delay represented a loss to the UNHCR equivalent to 
200 t of rice (40 000 USD at a rate of 200 USD/t). In this case, the 
payment procedures in use at the Commission were at fault. 
2. Deliveries made after the period of shortage 
91. A consignment of 400 t of butteroil, promised as emergency 
aid to Tanzania on 24 July 1979 and mobilized as such by means 
of a private treaty contract, was not delivered until December 
1979. 
92. In 1980 and 1981, deliveries to Mauritania, which had been 
requested for the period from May to June, arrived in November 
and even in January, i.e. after the period of shortage between 
harvests was over. These two cases highlight the slowness of the 
mobilization procedures. 
93. Following a request for emergency aid on 17 March 1981, an 
allocation of 2 000 t of milk powder was granted to China that 
same year in order to alleviate the consequences of a serious 
drought in Hebei province and floods in Hubei province. The first 
500 tonnes were shipped on 26 November 1981 and the first 
certificates of receipt were issued in China on 19 July 1982, i.e. 8 
months and 16 months, respectively, after the emergency had been 
declared, and probably long after it had ended. The shipment of 
the first 500 tonnes was made in November 1981, not in October 
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accepted by the Commission because of a breach, albeit minor, of 
the provisions relating to packaging (see paragraph 65 above), the 
contractor refused to deliver the remaining 1 500 t, which also had 
the same packaging defect. This refusal forced the Commission to 
enact a new mobilization regulation, on 15 December 1981, 
stipulating a shipment date for February 1982, i.e. two months 
later than the period provided for initially. 
94. These various shortcomings do not explain everything, 
however. For example, they do not explain why the allocation 
decision by Council Regulation was not taken until 28 April, even 
though the request for emergency aid had been made on 
17 March 1981, nor why the mobilization request was only made 
on 31 July, (ie. three months after the decision) or why the first 
mobilization regulation was not adopted until 8 October, (ie. more 
than two months after the mobilization request). They also do not 
explain why eight months elapsed between the first shipment and 
the first certificate of receipt. The legal file relating to this matter, 
which was examined by the Court, did not shed any light on this 
last point. The slowness of the Community's decision-making and 
mobilization procedures, and also probably the slowness of the 
administration in the recipient country, must therefore also be 
criticized. 
95. A promise by the Commission, on 25 March 1981, to grant 
2 000 t of cereals as immediate food aid to Mauritius, following 
hurricanes, actually materialized fifteen months later, on 20 June 
1982, when the aid finally arrived at Port Louis. Such sluggishness 
in the implementing of decisions is totally unacceptable. 
96. Despite urgent requests by the WFP, most of the aid granted 
to Tunisia via this organization from 1980 to 1982 (11 740 t of 
cereals, 3 264 t of milk powder, 170 t of butteroil) was delivered 
within a period of four to six months. One of the causes of the 
delays in 1982 was the cancellation and re-run of an invitation' to 
tender relating to 530 t of milk powder. 
97. Although the Commission knew that stocks of Zambian 
maize would run out in April 1983, the delivery of 15 0001, 
promised for May 1983, resulted in a contract for a triangular 
operation from Zimbabwe. The contract was not signed until 
29 June and the delivery only began in July. The delivery 
agreement was not formally signed until the end of August 1983. 
98. An allocation of 3 000 t of cereals and 600 t of milk powder 
to Botswana, which was decided on 14 July 1983 by way of aid to 
counter the effects of drought, had still not been mobilized in 
November 1983. 
99. Following a request made on 3 June 1983, 15 000 t of wheat 
were allocated to Indonesia. Although the need arose following a 
poor harvest in 1983, the goods were shipped in the middle of 
August 1984, ie. 14,5 months after the request and 4,5 months 
after the end of the period of shortage, even though the next 
harvest had already taken place. 
100. All these cases are disturbing insofar as they point to the 
conclusion that the procedures for implementing Community food 
aid are incapable of satisfying, in good time, the sometimes 
pressing requirements arising from emergency situations and 
unforeseeable disasters. 
3. Doubts about the delivery date and the consequences of such 
doubts 
101. Unforeseeable delays in implementation and erratic delivery 
periods leave the recipients in a state of uncertainty about their 
supplies. In Indonesia, an NGO, the Catholic Relief Services, 
keeps about six months of emergency stocks to ensure that its 
programmes are maintained despite uncertainties concerning 
Community delivery dates. 
102. In Sri Lanka, for the same reasons, another NGO declared 
that it was unable to introduce regular and continuous food 
programmes even for sectors of the population which were 
especially malnourished. For example, one part of the 1982 
allocation was shipped six months after the request and another 
part nine months after it. 
103. In Ruanda, two consignments of wheat, each amounting to 
2 2501, should have arrived at an interval of two months 
according to the provisions of the mobilization regulation ('). In 
fact, the two consignments arrived at the same time, creating 
serious storage problems. 
4. Unfortunate consequences of delays in delivery to certain 
locations 
104. Seen from Europe, the effects of combination of the aid 
time-tables, on the one hand, and the location of requirements or 
possible transport itineries on the other, are not obvious. 
However, they do exist. In Mali, each year the ULB dairy sends 
the Community a programme for restocking supplies, drawn up 
according to each region and period, and with an indication of the 
preferred ports of unloading. During the Court's visit of inspection 
in 1983, the management of the dairy drew attention to the fact 
that delays in shipment can make it necessary to change the port of 
unloading, the itinerary and the method of land transport. Thus 
aid for Gao and Timbuktu is sometimes transported via Abidjan, 
and sometimes via Lome\ 
105. Similarly, delays in the programme of cereal deliveries force 
the Office for Agricultural Products in Mali to transfer stocks from 
one region to another, thus creating additional transport costs. 
106. Cases where food aid products fail to conform to the rules 
in force or to desirable standards occur too frequently to be 
considered purely accidental or attributable to bad luck. 
107. Of course, it could be argued that the cases quoted represent 
only a fraction of the total tonnages delivered. However, this is 
probably not the most appropriate way of looking at the matter. In 
fact, the defective consignments should not be compared with the 
total deliveries, but. with the total aid which was inspected by the 
Court. Thus, out of 22 countries visited by the Court between No C 219/34  Official Journal of the European Communities  17. 8. 87 
1981 and March 1985 and subject to inspection relating to food 
aid, 14 countries had received poor quality deliveries. Cases of 
poor quality arose for nearly all products and occurred each year. 
Certain countries had a series of defective deliveries, such as 
Bangladesh, which had cause for complaint nearly every year (see 
paragraphs 5, 30, 36, 40 and 83 above), Indonesia, which had 
cause for complaint each year from 1979 to 1983 (paragraphs 42 
and 99 above), and Ghana, which had cause for complaint each 
year from 1977 to 1984 (paragraphs 8, 14, 23, and 64 above). 
(•) OJ L 192, 26. 7. 1980. 
(
2) United Nations Relief and works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
<
3) OJ L 153, 12. 6. 1985, p. 7. 
(«) OJL 116, 1.5. 1984, p. 11. 
(') Mobaization Regulations (EEC) No 1373/84, 3503/84, 3576/84, 3578/84 (for Kenya und Uganda) and 663/85 (OJ 
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ANNEX 2 
Differences between the system for mobilizing cereals and that for milk products which may affect 
the quality of aid 
CEREALS MILK PRODUCTS 
(Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80) (Regulation (EEG) No 1354/83) 
A. Provisions that do not provide as good a quality guarantee for milk products as for cereals 
It is stipulated that the security is 'to serve as a guarantee that the No equivalent stipulation, 
successful tenderer will fulfil his obligations' 
(Article 5(1)) 
2. 
The Quality control carried out at the initiative of the intervention agency 
is required for all deliveries, whether the product is mobilized on is specified only for products mobilized on the market and for 
the market or drawn from intervention stocks products obtained by industrial processing 
(Article 15 (1)) (Article 8 (1) and (2)) 
Cereals are checked at the port, at the time of shipment No time and place for checking milk products is specified, except 
(Article 15 (1)) in the case of industrial processing (vitaminized milk powder, 
butteroil), when it takes place during the manufacturing process 
{Article 8 (1), (2) and (4)) 
4. 
The intevention agency 
'arranges for a check' on the nature, quality and packaging of the 'checks' that the composition, quality and packaging comply with 
8
ood
s the regulation requirements 
(Article 15 (1)) (Article 8 (1) and (2)) 
5. 
The recipient's representative is invited to take part in the There is not stipulation that the recipient should take part in the 
inspection operation inspection operation 
(Article 15 (1), 2nd subparagraph) (Article 8 (1) to (4)) 
6. 
The intervention agency arranges for a second final inspection 
if the first inspection which it arranged has given rise to a if the quality has been disputed by the recipient following a check 
,
 spu*
e which he has requested and paid for 
(Article 15 (3)) (Article 20 (2)) 
. 7. 
The successful tenderer is under an obligation to replace the goods 
where the quality control arranged by the intervention agency where the goods have been declared definitively sub-standard after 
shows that the goods do not satisfy requirements the second final check has been carried out following the initial 
(Article 15 (4)) dieck reqUeSted by the recipient 
(Article 20 (3)) No C 219/36  Official Journal of the European Communities  17. 8. 87 
'all risks of carriage' 
(Article 13 (2)) 
Insurance for the shipping of a delivery to be effected at the CIF stage must cover 
'all risks associated with carriage' 
(Article 18 (2), 1st subparagraph) 
The shipping of a CIF delivery must be effected in vessels 
— not more than 15 years old 
'listed in the larger classes in recognized classification 
registers' 
'attested by a competent body as meeting hygiene 
requirements' 
(Article 4 (4 d)) 
— not more than: 15 years old in the case of charter services; 
25 years old in the case of regular cargo services 
— 'meeting all the technical and health requirements for the 
transport of milk products'. No certificate is required 
(Article 18 (1)) 
B. Provisions that do not provide as good a quality guarantee for cereals as for milk products 
1. 
No quality is mentioned in the Regulation  Detailed quality and packaging standards are set out in the 
Regulation 
The Regulation is only concerned with deliveries at the FOB and 
CIF stages 
The Regulation is concerned with all delivery stages — FOB, CIF 
and 'delivered place of destination' 
No equivalent provision  'Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the 
health standards in force on their territory are met' 
(Article 7) 
4. 
The Regulation does not mention any option for the successful 
tenderer of carrying out an inspection of the goods delivered to 
him by the intervention agency 
The successful tenderer is required to check to his own satisfaction 
that the quantity of skimmed-milk powder or butter made 
available by the intervention agency corresponds to the quantity to 
be supplied, and that the packaging of the product is dry, clean 
and undamaged 
(Articles 4 (2) and 6 (2)) 
With a view to aid in the form of butteroil, the intervention agency 
must enable interested parties to examine, at their own expense, 
samples of the butter proposed by the intervention agency 
(Article 6 (la)) 
The amount of the tendering security 
is not laid down in the Regulation which refers to the particular 
mobilization regulation setting out this information 
(Article 5 (1)) 
is laid down in the Regulation, as a percentage of the intervention 
value of the product 
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6. 
The contractor ('successful tenderer') must guarantee the goods drawn from intervention stocks 
through insurance covering the value of the product at the 
intervention price or reference price, according to the 
circumstances 
(Article 12 (5) and 13 (3)) 
through a 'security for delivery', the amount of which must be 
equal to the intervention price of the goods, plus 10 % 
(Article 4 (1) and 6 (lb)) 
No equivalent provision  The recipient can arrange for checks to be carried out prior to 
shipment, at his own expense 
(Article 20 (1)) 
No equivalent provision  'In the event of default or of unsatisfactory transport' by sea, the 
tenderer who has been awarded the contract for a delivery to be 
effected at the CIF stage 'shall, at the recipient's request, make all 
the necessary transport arrangements, including charter 
reservations' 
(Article 18 (1), last subparagraph) 
No equivalent provision  Provision for deductions from the tendering security and the 
delivery security are made in the event of any shipping delay for 
reasons attributable to the contractor ('successful tenderer') 
(Article 26 (5)) 
N.B, These differences regarding the mobilization of food aid should be compared with the following difference 
regarding the procedure for admission as intervention stock: 
CEREALS 
If there is agreement as to the quality and characteristics of the 
cereal offered, it is not necessary to cany out a sample laboratory 
analysis prior to admission as intervention stock 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1569/77 of 11. 7. 1977) 
MILK PRODUCTS 
Provision is made for a systematic check on manufacture prior to 
the admission of skimmed-milk powder as intervention stock 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 625/78 of 31. 3. 1978) NoC219/38 Official Journal of the European Communities 17. 8. 87 
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Glossary 
Delivery stages 
Commercial law concepts which set out the conditions according 
to which the responsibilities and risks relating to specific goods 
pass from the supplier to the buyer, and the place of this 
transfer. 
In commercial matters, the delivery stage may be freely negotiated 
between the supplier and buyer. However, reference delivery 
stages exist, for which precise definitions are given in 
INCOTERMS, a document drawn up by the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris. 
The buyer must charter the vessel at his own expense and bear the 
charges connected with any delay in the arrival of the vessel, 
including those which the supplier might have incurred on that 
account (e.g. storage costs, cost of immobilizing lorries or wagons 
and financial costs). 
The buyer must accept the goods immediately after shipment. 
However, case law acknowledges the buyer's right to question the 
conformity of the goods after landing — for example, when hidden 
defects could not be observed at the time of shipment, or when 
deterioration subsequent to delivery is attributable to the poor 
quality of packaging. FOB is one of the delivery stages used by the 
Community for supplies of food aid. 
For the execution of food aid, the European Community has itself 
defined various possible delivery stages, which have varied over 
the years. According to the circumstances, the stages used by the 
Community have been sui generis stages which do not exactly 
correspond to stages in general use in international trade and 
codified in INCOTERMS or, on the other hand, stages which refer 
explicitly to these definitions (replacing the term 'buyer' by the 
expression 'recipient of aid'). The stages currently used by the 
Community are 'FOB', 'OF and 'delivered place of destination' 
(see these terms). 
(*) CIF (cost, insurance, freight) 
From the point of view of taking over the goods, CIF is identical to 
FOB: the delivery is effected and the risks pass from the supplier to 
the buyer when the goods cross the ship's rail. 
The buyer accepts the goods after shipment, exactly as in the case 
of FOB, and, under case law, has a similar right of challenge, at 
the time of landing, in the event of a hidden defect. 
(*) FAS (free alongside ship) 
The supplier is required to deliver the goods within the period 
stipulated to the named port of shipment, at the loading berth 
named by the buyer, close to the mooring berth which is to be used 
by the vessel on which the goods will be loaded, and must notify 
the buyer of the delivery without delay. All costs and risks incurred 
in connection with the goods are borne by the supplier until such 
time as they are effectively set down at the named place. After this 
time, the costs and risks are the buyer's responsibility, particularly 
loading costs, stowage costs and expenses connected with any 
delays in the arrival of the vessel. It is in fact the buyer who must 
charter the vessel. 
The Community used the 'free alongside ship' stage until 1980 for 
cereals and until 1983 for milk products (calling it 'delivery to port 
of shipment'). From this time, it replaced this stage by FOB (see 
the definition of 'free on board'). 
(*) FOB (free on board) 
CIF differs from FOB in the way in which the shipping procedures 
are defined; i.e. the supplier must: 
— contract at his own expense for shipping by the usual route to 
the agreed port of destination; 
— take out at his own expense a policy insuring the goods during 
shipping against the risks involved in this shipping operation. 
The policy must be endorsed in the buyer's name. 
However, the commercial CIF refers to types of insurance policies 
which do not include cover for a range of risks regarded as special 
risks (theft, pilferage, leakage, breakage, chipping, sweat, contact 
with other cargoes, etc.) Only explicit clauses inserted into the 
policy provide cover for such risks. 
Whether or not the unloading costs are included in the shipping 
contract (and therefore in the costs borne by the supplier) is a 
question of local practice, which varies according to the port of 
unloading. Unloading costs are only automatically included, 
irrespective of the port, in the case of 'CIF landed' (see this 
term). 
The supplier is relieved of his responsibilities for the goods when 
they have passed the ship's rail at the time of loading. He bears the 
loading costs, but the buyer bears the stowage costs. 
CIF is one of the delivery stages used by the Community for 
supplies of food aid. No C 219/40 Official Journal of the European Communities 17. 8. 87 
(*) CIF landed 
It is CIF with the unloading costs borne by the supplier. Normal 
CIF does not automatically incorporate this specification. In fact, 
whether or not the unloading costs are included in shipping 
contracts depends on the practice followed in the ports (of 
unloading). See the term CIF. 
(*) Ex ship 
The delivery is effected and the risks pass from the supplier to the 
buyer at the time when the latter takes charge of the goods in the 
hold of the vessel at the port of unloading. The buyer bears the 
cost of unstowing and unloading, and, where relevant, lighterage 
and demurrage. 
The 'ex ship' stage was one of the delivery stages used by the 
Community until 1983. However, Community legislation 
excluded all references to commercial practice, and the 
Community stage was therefore not assumed to be the same as the 
stage recognized by commercial practice. 
(*) Ex quay, port of unloading 
The delivery is effected and the risks pass from the supplier to the 
buyer at the time when the product is set down on the quay of the 
named port of unloading. 
The supplier bears all the costs and risks which may be incurred by 
the goods up to this stage, i.e. demurrage costs (see this term), any 
lighterage costs and unloading costs. 
Up to 1983, the Community employed a delivery stage which was 
similar to this one: Community legislation in fact excluded all 
references to commercial practices. Thus, in the Community stage, 
the demurrage costs were borne by the recipient. 
The Community singled out a variant of this stage: delivery on the 
lighters and not on the quay. 
(*) Delivered place of destination 
The supplier delivers the goods to a warehouse or named place in 
the importing country and bears all the transport costs up to this 
point; if appropriate, he also bears the unloading costs if it is 
necessary or usual for the goods to be unloaded on their arrival at 
the named place. He must carry out all the formalities and bear all 
the customs duties and other taxes connected with the exportation 
of the goods outside the country of origin, any transit journey 
through one or more countries and the importation of the product 
in the destination country. He must provide the buyer with any 
document required for him to take delivery of the product at the 
named place. 
If appropriate, the buyer bears the unloading costs in the cases 
mentioned above and all expenses which he or the supplier incurs 
as a result of a delay in the goods being taken over. 
The Community has always used a 'delivered place of destination' 
stage, but it is not assumed to be the same as 'delivered place of 
destination' as used in commercial relations. Thus, in the 
Community sense, unloading is always the supplier's 
responsability; delivery always takes place 'in a warehouse' (i.e. 
not in the open air); the supplier is required to take out 
'appropriate insurance' for the carriage and unloading of the 
goods. 
Supply agreement 
Agreement in the form of letters between the European Economic 
Community and a recipient (country or organization). In these 
letters, the Commission, acting on behalf of the Community, 
informs the recipient of the Community's decision to grant him a 
given tonnage of a given product at a given supply stage, and 
announces that arrangements will be made to effect the delivery on 
receipt of agreement by the recipient on the delivery procedure and 
use of the aid. 
The agreement is signed for the Commission by a Member of the 
Commission, and, for the recipient, generally by the ambassador 
of the recipient country to the Communities or, in the case of an 
organization, its qualified representative. 
Supply agreements always include several annexes. In the case of 
direct aid (aid to a country), there are three annexes: 
I. General conditions 
This annex includes various commitments entered into by the 
contracting parties, which differ considerably according to 
whether the delivery in question is FOB, CIF or 'delivered place of 
destination' and whether the product is to be sold or distributed 
free of charge. For the Community, the party which commits itself 
is the Community, a legal entity represented by the Commission, 
and not the Commission itself. 
II. Delivery procedure 
In this annex, the Community informs the recipient of the rights 
and obligations which relate to the delivery of the product and 
which are incumbent on the various aid operators — supplier, 
intervention agency, recipient and the Commission itself, insolfar 
as it is involved in this process. 
The second annex is drafted in terms which differ according to the 
delivery stage, but also according to the product. From this annex, 
it is possible to state from what stage the risks are assumed by the 
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III. Special conditions 
This annex defines the characteristics and the packaging of the 
product and various specifications connected with the delivery in 
question — sometimes, for example, the use of counterpart 
funds. 
These three annexes are also found in indirect aid agreements 
(concluded with organizations). However, other annexes are 
added to such agreements, particularly in order to specify the 
conditions of carriage after the delivery stage and the aid financing 
conditions. 
Certificate of conformity 
Document in which the intervention agency certifies, prior to or at 
the time of shipment, that the product delivered and its packaging 
comply with the standards applicable. The obligation to issue such 
a certificate is not dependent on the delivery stage — FOB, CIF or 
'delivered place of destination'. It is not stipulated in certain cases 
of delivery of milk products originating from intervention stock. 
Notice of invitation to tender 
A document published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities and aimed at intervention agencies and tenderers. In 
the case of cereals and milk products, it only consists of an annex 
to the mobilization regulation and the notice of invitation to tender 
appears in the C series. Other products do not normally give rise 
to the publication of a notice of invitation to tender. 
Taking-over certificate 
Certificate drawn up and signed by the recipient or his 
representative, which is given to the supplier after he has delivered 
the product to the agreed place. It certifies that the product is of 
the prescribed quality. 
In the case of an FOB or CIF delivery, the certificate must be issued 
immediately after the vessel has been loaded. Furthermore, in the 
case of a CIF delivery, the supplier must have provided evidence 
that he has carried out his shipping obligations (chartering and 
insurance of the shipping operation). 
In the case of a 'delivered place of destination' delivery, the 
certificate must be issued immediately after the product has been 
unloaded at the warehouse at the agreed destination. 
If all the conditions for the issuing of the certificate have been met, 
but the recipient fails to draw it up and give it to the supplier, a 
certificate equivalent to the taking-over certificate and drawn up 
according to the same model is issued, for the FOB and CIF stages, 
by the intervention agency, which thereby guarantees the 
conformity of the product. In the case of the 'delivered place of 
destination' stage, the Community Delegate in the destination 
country or, in his absence, the embassy of one of the Member 
States of the Community issues a 'certificate' of the same form and 
bearing the same particulars as a taking-over certificate., thus again 
acknowledging the conformity of the product. 
Mobilization request 
Document attached to a single recto verso sheet, issued by the 
Directorate-General for Development (Commission DG VIII) to 
the Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG VI). It is designed to 
initiate the 'mobilization' of supplies, i.e. the preparation by DG 
VI of a draft mobilization regulation and notice of invitation to 
tender, the submission of the draft to the nearest competent 
Management Committee for approval, and, in the event of 
approval, the publication of the regulation and notice in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. 
Publication gives rise to the initiation of action by the agricultural 
intervention body, or bodies, responsible for organizing the 
invitations to tender, the award of contracts for the supply and 
transport of aid, quality control operations and making payment 
to the successful tenderers. 
Lay days 
Number of days stipulated in the charter-party (contract of 
affreightment) for the loading or unloading of a vessel. See the 
term 'demurrage'. 
Lot 
A lot of food aid is a certain tonnage of a given product, mobilized 
for the benefit of a given recipient for delivery at a given stage and 
place, shipment taking place during a given period. Lots vary in 
size, from a few tonnes to over 10 000 tonnes. The lot is the basic 
unit for the mobilization and tendering procedures and appears as 
such in the mobilization regulations, which cover from one to 
several dozen lots to be mobilized. Certain lots, involving high 
tonnages, may, however, be subdivided in the interest of separate 
tendering, by sub-lot. Conversely, a number of low-tonnage lots, 
bound for different places and recipients but involving the same 
product, to be delivered at the same time and place, are treated as 
sub-lots and grouped together for mobilization purposes to 
produce higher-tonnage lots. This is the case for much of the aid 
delivered at the FOB stage to the NGOs. 
Mobilization regulation 
Commission Regulation published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L series, relating to a product 
(skimmed-milk powder, butteroil, common wheat, etc.) or to a 
category of products (cereals) and with the purpose of mobilizing 
one or more consignments of food aid in the following weeks. 
Each consignment of cereals or of milk product gives rise to its 
inclusion in such a mobilization regulation. There are no 
mobilization regulations for the other product categories. 
Mobilization regulations have their own particular characteristics 
and must not be confused with the regulations laying down general 
rules for mobilization and supply, which set out the permanent 
mobilization rules for one category of products. 
Demurrage 
Time during which a vessel has been detained for loading or 
unloading over and beyond the lay days (see this term) agreed in 
the charter-party. The demurrage payment is made by the 
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THE COMMISSION'S REPLIES 
General observations 
The Commission has noted the comments made in the 
Court of Auditors' Report. It would stress, in this context, 
the degree to which the Court's final recommendations for 
new arrangemets are reflected in the new measures outlined 
by the Commission in July 1986 and given effect in the first 
instance in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3972/86 of 
22 December 1986, which in particular makes the 
Commission responsible for procurement of supplies and 
adopts more specific procedures in respect of food aid. The 
next stage will be the adoption of a single set of 
mobilization procedures for all sectors, which should come 
into force on 1 July 1987. Broadly speaking, these 
measures follow the line indicated by the Court of 
Auditors, and are therefore referred to at various points in 
the Comission's replies. 
Specific comments 
2. THE APPLICABLE RULES 
2.2. (e) to 2.5. Triangular operations have not hitherto 
been the subject of mobilization Regulations or notices of 
invitation to tender. The same applies to paragraph 2.5. 
However, this will change after the reform measures 
referred to in the General Observations. 
The supply agreements 
The comprehensiveness of the agreements 
2.4. (a) The exchange of letters with ambassadors to the 
Communities (see Glossary — Annex 3 to the Court's 
Report) deals only with the practicalities; the delivery 
period is not determined until later, at the express request 
of the authorities responsible for receipt. 
2.4. (b) See paragraph 2.16. 
2.4. (c) In any case, local requirements can more 
appropriately be specified in the mobilization request, since 
such requirements have a tendency to change. 
Moreover, some of the specifications sought by certain 
recipients would need to correspond to availabilities on the 
Community market, which again is verifiable only at the 
time of mobilization. 
Applicability of the agreements 
2.6. In general, the delivery periods indicated have been 
respected, but this cannot be done when the schedule 
requested by the recipient is unrealistic. 
2.6. (a) Mozambique 
There was a mistake in the official letter. This should have 
referred to delivery CIF, implying take-over at the port of 
shipment. 
2.6. (c) Annex 1, paragraph 21 (page 83) Mauritius 
This comment was made in the Court of Auditors' Report 
concerning financial year 1982. The Commission pointed 
out to the Court of Auditors at the time that all appropriate 
steps had been taken as rapidly as possible to resolve the 
situation. 
2.6. (d) With regard to the Court's second comment, the 
state of stocks was such that it was not possible to be 
certain of availability at the time of the mobilization 
commitment. 
The regulations on the mobilization of aid 
Sphere of application 
2.8. Agricultural products other than cereals and milk 
products have so far represented only a marginal 
proportion of the quantities mobilized in the Community. 
The absence of general or specific standing regulations 
covering these products does not therefore constitute a 
serious shortcoming. 
The drafting of specific rules for vegetable oils begun two 
years ago was suspended with a view to the adoption of a 
single set of Regulations for all sectors. 
The cereals Regulation preceded the milk Regulation and 
was drawn up at a time when products could be supplied 
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delivery 'free at destination', was in the process of 
finalization when preparations began on the reform of food 
aid as implemented by Regulation (EEC) No 3972/86. 
Complexity 
2.9. The single mobilization Regulation, referred to in the 
General Observations, will create a single set of rules to 
cover all delivery stages and all products. As regards the 
marking error, the Commission feels that this was merely 
an isolated case. 
2.10. It would be impossible to organize the 
implementation of Community aid on a tendering basis in 
the absence of a single reference corpus. The products 
mobilized in the Community, either from official stocks or 
on the market, comply strictly with the standards in force, 
notably concerning quality and packaging, which have 
been laid down within the framework of a general common 
policy. The same is true of the majority of the analysis and 
checking methods used. It is almost inconceivable to 
disregard such a reference corpus, notwithstanding certain 
specific requirements inherent in food aid. 
2.11. See Annex 2 — A 5 
Content 
Packaging 
2.12., 2.13. and Annex 1, paragraph 56 
The packaging assemblies for the transport of butteroil 
(cartons containing 4 metal canisters with a 5 kg capacity 
or 1 metal canister with a 20 kg capacity) must undergo 
destructive testing in accordance with the procedures 
described in Regulation (EEC) No 303/77, (Annex 1), 
superceded by Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 (Annex III). 
These tests, which simulate an accident rather than normal 
handling conditions, are monitored by an approved body 
which issues a certificate of conformity. 
If the packaging assemblies satisfy the destructive tests, 
within the deformation limits allowed, then the thickness 
of the sheet metal and the quality of the carton used must 
be considered adequate. 
The use of thicker sheet metal would increase the load 
weight and hence the transport cost, but would not provide 
an absolute guarantee against damage to the container or 
the content in the event of a drop or fall. 
However, suitable metal hoops would certainly secure the 
cartons more effectively. 
Incidentally, the standards adopted are those used in 
international trade and it was clear de visu during a visit to 
a packaging establishment that the tests carried out are 
satisfactory. 
One should generally also bear in mind the storage 
conditions which await the goods on their arrival at the 
destination. Efforts are, at all events, being made to secure 
improvements. 
Markings 
2.15. and Annex 1, paragraph 74 
The Commission had no knowledge, either before or 
during the clearance of accounts up to and including 
financial year 1979, of the failure of contractors to ensure 
proper markings on the packages, as stipulated in the 
Regulations on tendering. 
As regards aid operations in respect of which expenditure 
has been declared by the Member States during financial 
years 1980 et seq., the Commission continues to ensure 
that any failings in this regard are penalized prior to the 
current clearance of accounts. 
The responsibility for checking correct markings on the 
packaging falls, at present, to the Member State of 
mobilization. 
Transport 
2.16. For a FOB delivery, the choice of port of shipment 
by the contractor, subject to certain conditions (port 
accessible to seagoing vessels and connected with the 
country of destination by a regular shipping or charter 
service during the shipment period) is essential in order to 
guarantee competition within the Community for this type 
of delivery. Free competition is essential as a minimum 
assurance of equal treatment between the various regions 
of the Community and between operators. This is why the 
Commission has allowed for a single transhipment in the 
case of deliveries of processed and packaged products. 
This basic rule has also to meet the requirements of sound 
economic and financial management. Leaving the recipient 
to choose the port of shipment would be just as likely, if 
not more so, to lead to faulty or incompetent operations in 
cases where the port chosen was generally unsuited or had 
no proper equipment for handling exports or loading the 
products in question. 
Moreover, the designation in advance by the recipient of a 
single port of shipment would very often result in the 
Community budget having to bear very high additional 
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Example: rice, necessarily from Italy or Spain, to be loaded 
on board ship in Antwerp/Rotterdam. 
2.17. It is perfectly logical that the Community 
regulations should stipulate the age, classification and 
sanitary condition of vessels in respect of CIF deliveries 
only. 
The basic reason is that if the contractor assumes 
responsibility for sea transport, the transfer of risks and 
responsibilities effectively occurs at the port of shipment, as 
well as take-over by the recipient. The system in force 
establishes specific guarantees for the aid recipient in the 
case of this type of delivery, covering inter alia 
requirements in respect of the vessel and the endorsement, 
to the order of the recipient, of the non-negotiable bill of 
lading and of the marine insurance policy. 
These provisions were not used in the past for 'free at 
destination' deliveries since the contractor directly accepted 
all risks up to the final destination and the take-over there 
by the recipient. 
3. MONITORING THE APPLICATION OF THE 
. RULES 
Non-specific checks 
Adequacy of the non-specific checks 
Lack of sufficient evidentiary effect 
3.5. Every consignment of cereals supplied as food aid is 
checked at the time of shipment. In addition, the 
intervention agency regularly checks its stocks and is fully 
aware of the quality of the batches of cereals which it keeps 
in store. It selects consignments according to the quality 
prescribed in the regulation in question and, if necessary, 
undertakes drying of cereals containing excessive 
moisture. 
As regards milk products held in intervention that are 
delivered in the natural state, it has not previously been 
judged necessary to carry out a specific check on such 
products prior to shipment. 
Failure to take account of requirements peculiar to food 
aid 
Complementarity with the specific checks 
The approval of the manufacturer 
3.8. to 3.12. The quality conditions laid down in respect 
of food aid deliveries are sometimes more stringent than the 
rules on the eligibility of a product for purchase by 
intervention agencies. This is true in the case of the quality 
of cereals (moisture rate, protein content, etc.). However, 
this comment cannot be extended generally to all deliveries, 
particularly in the case of milk products to which the 
market regulation rules apply. 
It follows from the above observation that any specific 
qualities stipulated required for a product supplied as food 
aid do not call for special manufacturing methods or 
equipment. This is why, in the case of milk products, 
Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 lays down that products to 
be supplied as food aid may be manufactured by an 
undertaking which satisfies the conditions of approval 
stipulated in the market regulations with regard to entry 
into intervention (conditions concerning the standard of 
equipment, but also the keeping of records and stock 
accounts, for the purposes of inspection). 
Manufacturing supervision 
3.17. The Commission takes note of the Court of 
Auditors' comments. It would ask to be informed of this 
type of occurrence in time to initiate an enquiry if 
necessary, in accordance with Article 6 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 283/72. 
With regard to the case of fraud committed in 1976 and 
1977, the Commission would point out that it was not 
possible to institute a recovery procedure on account of the 
declared insolvency of the contractor and that it intends to 
close this dossier. 
The Commission is not able without further information to 
refute or confirm the Court's suspicion concerning the 
supply of milk powder to Indonesia. 
Quality control at the time of or with a view to 
shipment 
3.20. and 3.21. It is not feasible to check the conformity 
of milk products at the time of shipment because of 
analyses which have to be carried out in laboratory and 
necessitate a delay of several days. This is why products 
mobilized on the market are checked at an earlier stage, at 
the time of manufacture or packaging, the products 
subsequently being placed under customs or administrative 
control until shipment in order to prevent any substitution. 
This is why Article 20 of Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 
requires the contractor to submit appropriate 
documentation and also requires the intervention agency 
concerned to make a further, final check in the event of a 
dispute. 
The draft new Regulation will resolve this type of problem 
since it systematically provides for a check at the time of 
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Specific checks 
Approval of contractors 
3.22. Burkina Faso and Annex 1, paragraphs 26 and 27 
The checks carried out by the Commission in respect of the 
seven operations quoted by the Court of Auditors have 
been completed. In two cases it was found that the product 
did not conform to specifications. 
Given that there no longer exists the physical evidence by 
which the quality of the products supplied could be 
established objectively, the Commission has sought to 
verify, using documents provided by the intervention 
agency concerned: 
(i) that the checks specified in the Community regulations 
were carried out at the proper place having regard to 
the delivery stage agreed, and 
(ii) that the results of such checks conformed to the quality 
and quantity characteristics required. 
In the case of Burkina Faso and Tanzania, it was found 
that the quality standards had not been properly fulfilled. 
These conclusions were brought to the attention of the 
intervention agency and the financial consequences 
inherent in such irregularities will be dealt with when the 
accounts are cleared. 
The deductions for missing quantities were applied by the 
intervention agency itself. 
Note that the cereals Regulation precedes the milk 
Regulation (see answer for cereals in paragraph 2.8. 
above). 
The quality control carried out by contractors 
3.23. In the case of a product mobilized from intervention 
stock, the contractor organizes the transport of goods 
placed at his disposal by the intervention agency for 
subsequent delivery. The intervention agency retains 
responsibility for any defects in the quality of the product 
provided the contractor is able to show that he has met all 
his own obligations and that the fault cannot be ascribed to 
him. 
3.24. The contractor does bear the cost of the checks. 
The contractor bears the risks if the goods upon shipment 
do not conform with their description in the notice of 
invitation to tender. 
The quality control carried out at the initiative of the 
intervention agency at the time of or with a view to 
shipment 
3.26. (a) Since the intervention bodies are supposed to 
operate in the Community public interest the fact that they 
themselves carry out the checks should not mean that they 
are less objective. 
3.27. (a) Reference should be made to the answers given 
under paragraphs 4.30 and 4.42. 
3.27. (b) and 3.22., 3.41. (a), 4.28., 4.39., 4.49., 4.52., 
4.54. and Annex I, paragraphs 15, 18 and 25. 
At the Commission's request, the competent French 
authorities investigated the contractor. The results of the 
investigation confirmed the information provided initially 
by the intervention agency concerning the quality of the 
maize shipped. Since there is no longer any physical 
evidence by which the quality of the maize could be 
objectively established, the Commission considers the 
quality to have been established by the results of the three 
analyses carried out on samples taken from the shipment. 
Any financial consequences will be dealt with when the 
accounts are cleared. 
3.28. The Commission does not consider that the 
recipient's absence at the time of shipment could lead to 
less thorough checking on the part of the intervention 
agencies. 
In issuing the acceptance certificate in place of the 
recipient, the intervention agencies accept responsibility for 
the quality and quantity of the goods at the time of 
shipment and thus if anything have an interest in carrying 
out stricter checks, since they would have to bear the 
penalties at the time of the clearance of accounts resulting 
from any defect discovered, should it be established that at 
the time of shipment the consignment did not comply with 
Community rules. 
In addition, the Court refers to a number of examples, a 
large majority of which relate to the period prior to 
1984. 
Common observations in respect of checks with a view to 
shipment 
Excessive importance attached to taking-over or 
compliance certificates on shipment 
3.35. The mobilization Regulations for cereals and milk 
products, which to a large extent adopted the rules 
governing commercial deliveries FOB and CIF, contain a 
number of legal safeguards enabling an aid recipient to 
institute proceedings should the consignment prove 
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non-negotiable net bill of lading made out to the order of 
the recipient which, constituting the title to the goods 
concerned, enables an action to be brought against the 
carrier. The same applies in the case of the marine 
insurance document also endorsed to the order of the 
recipient, which should in many cases enable an action to 
be brought by the latter against the insurer. 
It is true, nevertheless, that aid recipients themselves, 
unlike commercial operators, do not or cannot operate the 
machinery available to ensure that they get the benefit of 
Community aid. This is why the new draft mobilization 
Regulation introduces the port of landing stage instead of 
the CIF stage. In addition, the Commission is studying the 
most appropriate type of insurance. 
3.36. and 3.37. If it is adopted, this new mobilization 
Regulation will impose more stringent requirements 
regarding the availability of results of analyses prior to the 
shipment of goods. There is thus every reason to believe 
that shortcomings such as described could be avoided. 
3.39. The Commission does not accept the conclusion of 
this paragraph, which it does not consider justified. 
Control and monitoring of implementation after shipment 
3.40. The draft new mobilization Regulation ratifies and 
makes official practice the checking procedure described by 
the Court of Auditors. 
3.41. See paragraph 3.27. (b). 
3.42. The overall supervision hitherto provided 
independently by the intervention agencies has perhaps 
made it more difficult for the Commission to keep a close 
watch on supplies. However, one cannot conclude from 
this division of responsibilities that the Commission takes 
no interest in the implementation of the aid. Once notified 
of any problems, the Commission has always acted to 
facilitate the implementation of operations. The new 
guidelines for monitoring take account of the need for more 
general information and for closer supervision of 
deliveries. 
4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND GUARANTEES 
Unequal value of the various delivery stages as regards 
quality 
4.4. The new guidelines contained in the draft new 
mobilization Regulation accord with the Court of Auditors' 
conclusions regarding the unsuitability of CIF terms for 
food aid. 
On a technical level the Commission would point out that 
the contractor may decide to conclude a specific contract 
for unloading if the delivery terms stipulated in the charter 
party do differ from those contained in the notice of 
invitation to tender. 
Obligations, guarantees and penalties at the various 
stages 
The economic operator's obligations 
The intervention agencies' obligations 
4.7. It must be stressed that the relations between the 
intervention agency and the Commission can in no sense be 
understood legally in terms of mandate or agency. 
As the Court of Justice pointed out in its Eurico judgment 
of 18.10.1984, the national agency appointed by the 
Member State has to apply the Community legislation 
direct, acting independently, and also takes responsibility 
for organizing invitations to tender and monitoring 
supplies. The links between the agency and the 
Commission are not in the nature of subordinate authority 
or administrative hierarchy, but reflect a division of 
functions and cooperation within the Community. It is 
necessary to make this legal point in order to get a clear 
view of how the Community system operates. The 
alternative is thus simply for the Commission itself to take 
over the supervision of supplies. 
Insurance 
Marine transport insurance of products 
delivered CIF 
4.10, 4.25, 4.28, 4.36, 4.41, 4.47, 4.48,4.49, 5.22, 5.23, 
5.24. 
In as much as the Court itself implicity recommends the 
abandonment of CIF deliveries (see paragraph 6.3) — 
which the Commission has done in the draft new 
mobilization Regulation — the problem of the designation 
of the recipient and the precise insurance cover becomes 
irrelevant in the case of a consignment 'delivered port of 
landing'. 
It should be noted also that the Commission itself is not 
always the most suitable authority to approve the release of 
securities. For geographical as much as technical reasons, it 
is better to rely on experts present during loading and/or 
unloading operations. The Commission has adopted this 
solution. 17. 8. 87  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 219/47 
With regard to utilization of the insurance compensation, 
this will henceforth be a decision for the contractor alone, 
and it will be in his interest to show due diligence since he 
will be required to replace missing or damaged products. 
Securities 
Tendering security 
4.12. (a) The difference in the amount of the securities is 
explained by the fact that in the case of products supplied 
from intervention, the tendering security is replaced by a 
delivery security covering the value of the goods, while in 
the case of market mobilization, there is a single security 
which covers the entire supply operation. 
4.12. (b) The fixing of the amount of the security in the 
specific tendering Regulations allows for adjustment of the 
security if necessary on a case by case basis. 
Comparative assessment in the light of the quality 
objective 
Who benefits from the guarantee? 
4.22. The duties of the intervention agencies are basically 
to ensure proper implementation of the food aid 
Regulations and to carry out those tasks for which they are 
responsible under the Regulations in the Community 
interest and in such a way that the Community can fulfil its 
international obligations. 
The provision for consultations reflects the division of 
labour between the intervention agencies and the 
Commission. Their aim is to ensure the necessary 
consultation and coordination prior to any claims which 
the Commission may have to make on the recipient. 
Guarantees which may be mobilized directly or via a third 
party 
4.29. If any intervention agencies were to release 
securities in error, they would be penalized at the clearance 
of accounts in that the sum of the security improperly 
released would not be accepted as expenditure. Such cases 
are, however, rare, since the practice of the agencies is to 
inform the Commission before releasing the security where 
doubt exists as to the decision to take. 
4.30., 4.42. and Annex 1, paragraphs 65 and 93 
The delivery of the 500 tonnes of milk powder in question 
was perfectly correct, except for a minor detail concerning 
packaging, which did not prevent the product reaching its 
destination in perfect condition. An action has been 
brought over the packaging by the Member State against 
the contractor. An appeal has been lodged against the 
jugdment in these proceedings. 
Legal proceedings were also instituted against the 
contractor for failure to deliver the remaining 1 500 
tonnes. Once the liability of the first contractor had been 
definitively established, tenders were once again invited for 
the allocation of these 1 500 tonnes. 
The financial aspect of these deliveries will be settled at the 
clearance of accounts in the light of the jugdments of the 
national courts. 
4.33. The Commission is aware of certain problems 
which may arise as a result of the backlog in the clearance 
of accounts. As the Court has pointed out, this backlog is 
currently being reduced. 
However, the Commission would emphasize that 
expenditure is subject to systematic monthly checking from 
the initial stage when the advance is made to the Member 
States and declared for the monthly entry against the 
budget. 
Each operation is in any case monitored systematically 
from beginning to end so that as far as possible an 
immediate technical solution can be found to any problems 
arising — in the interest of rapid delivery — as well as a 
financial solution, where liability for any fault can already 
be established. 
Hence, the intervention agencies apply any penalties, either 
on their own initiative or as a result of reservations by the 
Commission when it is informed of certain difficulties. 
Declared expenditure is admittedly immediately charged to 
the budget, but at this stage this does not in any way 
amount to a recognition of the justification of the 
expenditure. 
It should also be borne in mind that many problems will 
already have been resolved prior to the expenditure 
declaration, thus the solution is incorporated in the 
delcaration. 
Lastly, the financing system just described allows financial 
regularization by the Member State at any time after the 
initial declaration, which means that a given problem docs 
not have to wait to be dealt with until the clearance of 
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Obviously, cases whose complexity prevents a clear 
determination of responsibilities — pending legal 
proceedings, investigation in progress — cannot be 
regularized except at the clearance of accounts. 
Clearance by sampling is justified on the one hand by the 
large number of operations to be checked in relation to the 
staff available, and on the other hand by the existence of 
the system of prior and concomitant monitoring described 
above. 
Extent of financial responsibility and definition of 
obligations 
4.38. There are many cases in which intervention agencies 
reject the goods before shipment and require the contractor 
to replace them. 
Moreover, a product cannot be replaced on account of 
poor quality observed at its place of destination unless it is 
established that it is unfit for human consumption and the 
quality impairment is not a manifest consequence of poor 
handling and storage on the part of the recipient. 
At all events, contractors are always penalized if they are 
found to be at fault. The frequency with which financial 
penalties are imposed, which the Court considers low, 
obviously depends on the number of infringements detected 
by the Commission and/or the intervention agencies. 
In any case, in the event of faulty performance the 
operation will be repeated if the Commission considers 
there to be conclusive evidence that the fault is not 
attributable to the conduct of the recipient. 
Very often the guarantee holder does not put the 
guarantee into effect 
4.39., 4.53. and Annex 1, paragraphs 33, 34 and 35. 
With regard to Tunisia, the Commission is not for the time 
«being able to offer fresh information concerning the 
operation referred to by the Court of Auditors. 
In any case, the intervention agencies do not accept 
products that do not conform to standard. The 
Commission has sometimes accepted minor departures 
from quality
x standards which do not affect the overall 
quality of the product, when asked to do so by the 
intervention agencies, and in the interest of prompt delivery 
at the request of the recipient. 
Any discrepancy also results in either a price reduction or 
the forfeiture of all or part of the security. 
The 5 000 t of soft wheat supplied to Benin (under reg. 
1824/80), mentioned by the Court, will be the subject of a 
decision during the clearance of accounts procedure 
relation to the 1980 exercise. 
4.40. Ghana's failure to submit a claim to the insurance 
company is not unfortunately an isolated case. The 
Commission reacted by instructing its officials and in 
particular its delegations to arrange, at its own expense, for 
a supervisory body to carry out a damage assessment. 
This measure was announced in the Commission's reply to 
paragraph 10.15 in the 1984 Report. 
Although CIF deliveries — the only cases in which the 
recipients are required to handle the insurance — are about 
to be discontinued, steps have been taken to arrange for 
official damage assessments, which are essential in order to 
obtain insurance compensation. 
4.41. The Commission is aware that the situation 
mentioned by the Court can cause problems and always 
reminds recipients of the obligations arising under the 
official letters, which are a matter for them. 
The contractor's obligations are not strict 
enough 
Permitted discrepancies in respect of weight 
4.43. These tolerances are a practice objectively justified 
by the weight losses due to handling and transport. They 
are not a 'privilege' for the contractor. 
Cases where the contractor is released from his 
obligations 
4.44. (ii) Force majeure is a generally acknowledged 
ground for exoneration of responsibility in Community law 
and cannot be excluded. As regards its application, the 
Member States and the Commission refer to precedent 
judgments of the Court of Justice. 
Obligation to carry out precise operations or obligation to 
achieve a result 
4.48., 5.18. It is well known that insurance companies do 
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delivery of goods, especially where certain destinations 
have caused problems as a result of political conflicts, 
infrastructure constraints, or arbitrary decisions by the 
recipient countries. In such marginal cases, 'force majeure' 
is and will continue to be the sole factor determining 
exoneration or responsibility. 
<* 
4.49. The Commission does not share the Court of 
Auditors' view regarding the unlikeliness of a product 
delivered 'free at destination' being replaced. 
The Community's guarantee: the final guarantee or the 
first? 
4.54. and Annex 1, paragraph 32 — WFP butteroil. 
The replacement was agreed because budget funds so 
allowed. This is not, however, always the case. 
5. POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW 
TO REFORMING THE SYSTEM 
Simplifying and speeding up the procedures 
Overcoming the political complexity of food aid 
5.1. Since the reform of food aid under Regulation (EEC) 
No 3972/86 of 22 December 1986, the number of stages 
in the procedure has been considerably reduced. 
5.7. Certain of the recipient countries are consulted with 
the speed recommended in the Report. 
Ensuring the consistency of management documents 
5.12., 5.13., 5.14. Even in the context of the food aid 
reform described in the General Observations, it is not 
possible to envisage a single document applicable both to 
contractors and recipients. 
However, there can and must be an effort to achieve 
greater consistency. This will be done as a corollary to the 
single mobilization Regulation, by redrafting the standard 
official letters. 
Better definition of controls and responsibilities 
5.15., 5.16., 5.17., 5.20. The new draft mobilization 
Regulation provides for a system of checks and monitoring 
which will meet the concern expressed by the Court of 
Auditors. 
5.17. The checks in force, where they reveal a defect, 
determine as far as possible where the responsibility lies 
and penalize any failure by the contractor to fulfil his 
obligations. As the Commission has already pointed out in 
paragraph 3.35, the recipient has guarantees and legal 
instruments at his disposal, but is not always able to make 
use of them. 
Awarding more contracts with an obligation to achieve a 
result 
5.19., 5.20., 6.2. en 6.3. (b) (conclusion). 
The Commission shares the Court of Auditor's view as 
regards the desirability of using a single contractor. 
It notes, however, that the Court itself recognizes that this 
type of contract cannot be used systematically, without 
first considering factors such as the efficiency of the 
operation, the safety of the goods, and the comparative 
cost of single and split contracts. 
There is also the incidence of indirect aid, which likewise 
splits up deliveries for reasons which are sometimes pure 
expediency. 
Under the new mobilization Regulation which it is 
proposing, the Commission will have the legal and 
practical means to set up a system that will ensure optimal 
implementation of the aid, taking account of the various 
parameters. 
The presence of a Commission representative is stipulated 
both at loading and at unloading as well as at any 
intermediate reloading points. The representative will not 
only carry out quality and quantity checks but also monitor 
operations with a view to ensuring coordination between 
the various operators. A redirection of budget resources is 
accordingly envisaged. 
6. CONCLUSION 
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ANNEX 1 
List and description of deliveries of substandard goods noted by the Court 
The Commission takes note of the Court of Auditors' 
observations. However, it would point out that in some cases it 
has been unable to check all the points mentioned. Nevertheless, 
the Commission can assure the Court that whatever the 
circumstances, the financial implications of any failings on the part 
of contractors and /or the Member States have been and will 
continue to be taken into consideration when the accounts are 
cleared. 
A. Inadequacies relating to the amount delivered (or the value 
transferred) 
12. The 33,4 missing tonnes represent 0,22 % of the 15 000 
tonnes to be supplied (23,3 tonnes = 0,16 %, hence l,6%o). This 
is well below the permitted tolerance. 
15. See paragraph 3.27. (b). 
16. Article 13 (5) of Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80 applies to all 
aid under CIF contracts, including UNHCR/Pakistan aid, and the 
contractor's obligations covered wharfage. 
B.  Inadequacies relating to the type and quality of the product 
24. It should be noted that maize produced in Europe is generally 
of superior quality to United States maize imported into the 
Community. 
25. 26. 27. 
Report). 
See reply to- paragraph 3.28. (first part of the 
36. This example is out-of-date; since 1981, common wheat 
must be of breadmaking quality. 
37. See reply paragraph 46 (Djibouti). 
38. Since the installation of modern milling facilities financed by 
foreign capital, European flour, or indeed European wheat are 
apparently no longer suitable for this recipient country. 
39. A checking system which gives results prior to shipment is 
difficult to arrange for unprocessed products (see paragraphs 3.35 
to 3.39. of the Report). 
41. The answers were supplied following the Report referred to 
in this paragraph. The rice aid deliveries in 1979, in which the 
quality of the product was at issue, will be dealt with when the 
accounts for financial year 1980 are cleared. 
46. See reply B.37. The results of the analysis carried out by the 
two Belgian laboratories are not open to question. This transport 
problem should be regarded as an accident, which could happen 
again at any time. 
D. Inadequacies relating to the time and place of delivery or 
distribution 
85. For very small quantities, such as 109 tonnes of the 
unprocessed product to be delivered FOB, there is little 
commercial incentive, which accounts for the lack of tenders. 
87. See second part of the reply to paragraph B.47. 
95. The Court of Auditors' question and the Commission's reply 
are contained in the Report for financial year 1982. 
98. The implementation of this aid, especially the cereals, was 
delayed owing to the fact that the decision had been taken to 
deliver CIF, whereas the recipient was a landlocked country. It was 
therefore necessary to negotiate with the bodies concerned for 
free-at-frontier delivery. 
99. The delay noted is due to the exchange of official letters with 
the recipient country and to the mobilization request submitted by 
it. 
105. It should be noted that since the second half of 1981, all 
requests for the mobilization of cereals aid have been processed 
and despatched without delay. 
Burundi, paragraph 2; UNHCR, paragraph 12; Bangladesh, 
paragraph 57; Benin, paragraph 61. The new mobilization 
Regulation, if adopted, will prevent this type of problem since 
losses and damage will be charged to the contractor. 
Ghana, paragraph 4, paragraph 8, paragraph 31: Tanzania, 
paragraph 10; UNHCR, paragraph 12; Cape Verde, para-
graph 24; WFP, paragraph 32; Tunisia, paragraph 34; 
Bangladesh, paragraph 36; Benin, paragraph 39; Zambia, 
paragraph 44. The introduction of checking and monitoring at all 
delivery stages (General Observations) will make for improved 
surveillance of the quality and quantity of products supplied. 
Ghana, paragraph 9; Zambia, paragraph 13; Brurundi, para-
graph 69. The Commission is aware that efforts could be made to 
improve the general packaging of products supplied as food aid. It 
has already formulated preliminary considerations which could 
serve as a basis for pilot schemes under the new mobilization 
Regulation. It is possible that this approach may not be sufficient 
by itself and if circumstances allow, the Commission may have a 
study carried out by an outside consultant with a view to obtaining 
recommendations on the most appropriate type of presentation or 
packaging for each product and each recipient separately, taking 
into account inter alia the practice of certain bilateral aid 
authorities which seem to be fairly efficient. 
The investigations envisaged could, if appropriate, be extended to 
cover storage conditions in the recipient countries. 
Comoros, paragraph 6; paragraph 47. As stated in the answers to 
the Court of Auditors' comments concerning financial year 1982 
(paragraph 10.16.), the unloading conditions are well known to 
the Commission, which takes the necessary steps each time, as far 
as is possible. A more radical solution will be possible once CIF 
contracts are discontinued. 17.8.87  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 219/51 
UNHCR, paragraph 16. The charter terms are part of the 
contractor's obligations. He is required under Article 13(5) of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80 to deliver the goods up to and 
including wharfage. The recipient has the same contract rules and 
should therefore have refused to pay the unloading costs. 
Ghana, paragraph 23. An answer was given by the Commission to 
the Court following the Report for financial year 1984. 
Tunisia, paragraph 33. The facts criticized by the Court would not 
have arisen if the taking-over certificate had been rejected by the 
recipient or his representative. The new mobilization Regulation 
will make stricter stipulations in this regard. 
Djibouti, paragraph 37; paragraph 46; paragraph 87. The Court 
of Auditors' observations and the Commission's replies are 
contained in the Report for financial year 1983. 
Indonesia, paragraph 42. The Court of Auditors' observations and 
the Commission's replies are contained in the Report for financial 
year 1984. 
Morocco, paragraph 49, paragraph 72, paragraph 79. The 
Court's observations and the Commission's replies concerning the 
goods delayed in Casablanca, the prolonged storage and the 
incorrect handling and markings are contained in the Report for 
financial year 1982. 
Cape Verde, paragraph 50. It would appear that the situation 
reported by the Court was the responsibility of the recipient 
country. 
Bangladesh, paragraph 83. The delay noted in recent years in the 
delivery of cereals aid is the fault of the recipient country, which 
takes too long accepting the delivery terms specified in the official 
letters. 
WFP, paragraph 85. It is hardly surprising that such a small 
consignment should have difficulty in attracting tenders 
immediately. 
Senegal, paragraph 88. This sort of dispute between the contractor 
and the shipowner to which the Commission is not a party is one 
of the most difficult types of problem to resolve. The adverse 
consequences for recipients will be less following the adoption of 
contracts 'delivered port of unloading'. 
Senegal, paragraph 89. At the WFP's initiative, basic aid 
coordination was written into the Dublin Plan. It has brought 
about improvements, but there is little sign yet of genuine 
coordination between donors. 
UNHCR, paragraph 90. It is true that staff shortages have 
sometimes considerably slowed down payments. 
WFP, paragraph 96. It may be common agricultural policy rules 
that dictate the repeat of a notice of invitation to tender. 
NGO — Sri Lanka, paragraph 102. A common organization is 
often used to centralize food-aid deliveries to NGOs, a fact which 
may affect the time scheduling. No C 219/52  Official Journal of the European Communities  17. 8. 87 
ANNEX 2 
Differences between the system for mobilizing cereals and that for milk products which may affect the quality 
of aid 
A. Provisions that do not provide as good a quality guarantee for milk products as for cereals 
Broadly speaking, the differences between the legislation covering cereals and that for milk products derive 
from the fact that the two sets of rules were drawn up with an interval of several years, after very long and 
sensitive discussions and meetings involving experts anxious to preserve certain provisions specific to their 
sector. Each of the two Regulations contained new provisions and technical improvements by comparison with 
the previous rules, at the same time setting about a gradual harmonization of the principal procedures. 
The ultimate objective is the adoption of a single instrument for all sectors supplying food aid products. 
Hence, for example: 
1. The cereals Regulation (EEC) No 1974/80 calls for a single security to cover the contractor's obligations 
up to the supply stage. It is not a tendering security in the technical sense, and that term does not appear in the 
Regulation. 
3. The place of checking is fixed implicitly, as either the place or manufacture or processing, or the place of 
preparation or packaging (Regulation (EEC) no 1354/83, Article 8 (4)). The timing of the check is for the body 
responsible for analysis and verifications to decide. The article in question also specifies that the lots to be 
supplied may not be dispatched from the control premises until authorization is granted. 
5. The difference between the two Regulations is explained by the fact that in the case of cereal products, the 
recipient may be present or represented at the port where the sampling operations and checks are to be carried 
out, m accordance with trade practices. However, in the case of milk products, the checks must be carried out 
at an earlier stage, at the place of manufacture or packaging, and the Member States have so far been most 
reluctant to contemplate the presence on such occasions of representatives of the recipients. 